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Since the end of the Cold War, the armed forces of the United States have 
increasingly been involved in military operations other than war (OOTW).  Many service 
members feel these missions are contrary to the central purpose of the military and not in 
keeping with the reasons why they originally joined the service.  Research shows that a 
mismatch job expectations and job realities can be a factor in reducing retention. Thus, 
the military’s leaders have made a conscious effort to eliminate “message mismatch” and 
better align the words, expectations, and actions of their individual services.  In doing so, 
they hope to create greater organizational credibility and personal commitment for their 
forces. 
 The purpose of this research is to examine the general level of awareness, 
understanding, expectations and actual involvement concerning OOTW that exist among 
future naval officers at the United States Naval Academy and current junior officers. 
Conclusions about the possible expectation-reality gap among future naval officers 
concerning OOTW is explored.  Recommendations for further research and implications 
for policy makers are offered to possibly decrease the gap between service member 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
Operations Other Than War (OOTW) is a contemporary term used to describe a 
wide variety of missions performed by the United States military that fall short of full-
scale war.  These missions are not really new to the military, but their frequency and 
duration are.  They typically include such operations as humanitarian assistance, disaster 
relief, foreign internal defense, drug interdiction, supporting U.S. civil authorities, non-
combatant evacuations, and peacekeeping. 
It was believed that when the Cold War came to an end, the United States would 
enjoy a large peace dividend as the sole surviving superpower.  While the threat of full-
scale war has diminished, the U.S. military finds itself facing increasing demands with 
fewer resources.  In the absence of a “bipolar world”, new power imbalances have 
emerged and regional instabilities have been able to boil over into conflict.  In addition, 
disaster responses throughout the world have seen increasing levels of military 
commitment.  The peace dividend has not only changed the role of the U.S. military, but 
has expanded it.  Recent U.S. foreign policy has placed much more emphasis on 
employing the military for OOTW.  As Schlesinger (1998) writes: 
Force deployment in the post-Cold War years, driven by “military 
operations other than War,” has been far more frequent, far larger, and of 
far longer duration than during the Cold War itself. That is a reflection of 
our expanded foreign policy role and of our willingness, in practice if not 
in theory, regularly to serve as the world’s policeman…. The result is an 
awesomely high operation tempo for the services—one which they are 
sustaining only with difficulty and at a higher long-run cost in readiness, 
morale, and retention rates. (Schlesinger, 1998, p.5) 
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These operations are generally not well-defined.  They cover a large spectrum 
from peace missions and humanitarian assistance to “watch-standing” duties in the 
Arabian Gulf.  Their focus is deterring war and promoting peace.  They have more 
restrictive and complex rules of engagement than war proper, and are more sensitive to 
various political considerations. 
Traditionally, the military has been reluctant to engage in these operations, based 
upon its culture and training.  Increasingly, however, service members are finding 
themselves deployed more often, longer, and in situations for which they were not 
prepared or trained, or that they even understand.  These missions are becoming more 
common as they subsume more of the “traditional” military missions formerly associated 
with the Cold War. This change is believed to contribute to a growing wave of frustration 
among the men and women who currently serve in America’s all-volunteer military, and 
has forced some of them to vote with their feet.    
For many, the frustration they felt while in the military was a factor in  
Their decision to exit. They complained of confusing missions and long  
deployments away from home—assignments that require expertise they  
neither trained nor entered the military for. (Yablonka, 2000, p.14) 
 
In a 1999 General Accounting Office (GAO) study it was suggested that an 
understanding gap exists regarding what factors influence people to stay in the military.  
The decisions of active-duty personnel to remain in service have traditionally been 
perceived as a result of events in an individual’s past, such as his or her deployment 
history.  According to the GAO study, past deployment indicators may not adequately 
explain an individual’s decision to stay or leave. The decision may, in fact, be based more 
upon one’s expectations of future circumstances, rather than on experiences of the past. 
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In recent years civilian and military leaders have adopted new initiatives in an 
effort to re-engineer their organizations to be more effective and efficient at meeting 
customer, as well as employee needs.  In the process, several key factors have been found 
to separate organizational success from failure in this initiative.  One of these factors is 
the ability to obtain corporate “buy-in” or commitment from empowered people.  
Stakeholder “buy-in” is based largely upon an individual’s past experiences in an 
organization, as well as anticipation of the events expected to affect that organization.     
A review of the literature has shown that when employee expectations are not 
met, frustration results.  Frustration has been commonly cited by those who decided to 
leave the military.  Therefore, it is possible that aligning expectations with reality may 
help to reduce such frustrations, thereby improving the quality of life and influencing 
more personnel to remain in military service.  
The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark, lists his “Top 5” priorities 
for the Navy in the December 2000 issue of All Hands magazine.  In order, Clarke’s 
priorities are: manpower, current readiness, future readiness, quality of service, and 
alignment.  On the issue of “alignment,” the CNO states: 
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…alignment involves clear communication, from the 
recruiter, to the LPO to the CO to the CNO.  It’s about 
communicating realistic expectations and then helping 
Sailors accomplish realistic goals—in a word, credibility.  
This type of situation is not conducive to good 
retention. Together, with commanding officers and senior 
enlisted leadership, we will work to rid ourselves of 
message mismatch- saying one thing and meaning 
something else. My goal is to eliminate message mismatch 





The objective of this thesis is to draw conclusions about the expectations of future 
naval officers at the United States Naval Academy (USNA) regarding OOTW and to 
explore the potential impact of these expectations upon the officers’ longevity in the 
military.  
 This objective is pursued in the thesis by attempting to answer the following 
research questions:  
1) How do midshipmen understand the changing roles of the military in terms of 
OOTW?  
 
2) What do midshipmen believe the likelihood/possibility is of their personal 
involvement in these operations? 
  
3) What is their current understanding of military roles/operations? 
 
4) Where does this current understanding (if any) originate? (Family, Friends, 
Recruiters, USNA?) 
 
5) What do midshipmen believe the likelihood/possibility is of their personal 
involvement in “traditional” military operations?  
 
6) If they are aware of the military’s involvement in OOTW, do they expect to be 
personally involved during their initial service obligation? 
 
 5
7) Is participating in OOTW missions more/less appealing than in more traditional 
military roles (i.e., preparing to fight a major two-theater war)? 
 
8) If midshipmen had the initial expectation that they would most likely serve 
primarily in OOTW missions, would this affect their decision to enter service? 
Would it affect their decision to stay? 
 
9) Do their expectations change from the time they enter the Naval Academy as 




C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, & ASSUMPTIONS 
This research focuses on USNA midshipmen’s understanding of OOTW and 
theirexpectations for personal involvement in these operations.  The study also looks at 
the former and current expectations of junior officers at USNA with respect to OOTW, as 
well as the actual fleet experiences of these officers in such operations.  The results from 
these two groups are compared to assess the amount of alignment between midshipmen’s 
expectations of OOTW and junior officer’s former expectations and actual experiences 
with OOTW.  Research participant awareness and expectations are evaluated through 
self-reports from Fourth-class midshipmen, First-class midshipmen, and junior officers.  
Conclusions are then drawn about OOTW and the possible existence of a “reality-
expectation disconnect” and its potential impact upon naval officer retention.   
It should be noted that the study results are limited to some extent by the timing of 
the survey.   The primary group of interest is Fourth-class midshipmen.  This group was 
chosen for the study to understand the initial, or pre-organizational entry expectations of 
new “employees” before these expectations could be influenced by experience and the 
organization itself.  However, at the time of data collection, the Fourth-class midshipmen 
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had already been at USNA for nine months and exposed to an intense process of military 
socialization process.   
It should also be noted that this particular study examined only future and current 
naval officers at USNA.  As a professional military university, it is assumed that the 
members (midshipmen and faculty) are probably the most knowledgeable in addressing 
service culture, history, and general military education.  The expectations and 
experiences of midshipmen and naval officers stationed elsewhere may be quite different.  
Additionally, the expectations and experiences of cadets and officers from the other 
services may be quite different from those of the sampled population. 
Many early studies of employee turnover differ in the manner turnover is 
measured.  These studies typically fail to separate participant groups according to gender, 
do not cross-validate findings, and tend to assume that all turnover is bad. (Mowday et 
al., 1982)  These early limitations are often addressed in later research, including the 
present study.   
Early research efforts have provided evidence of the impact of several factors 
upon the process of organizational turnover. This paper, however, focuses only on one 
factor, the role of expectations, in the turnover process.    
Finally, while all individuals have expectations upon entering a new organization, 
these expectations vary from the nature of the job itself, to the rewards system, and the 
types of social interaction among others.  These expectations also differ from individual 
to individual in accordance with personal values and previous experiences at the time of 
assessment.  This study examines only the expectations of “employees” with respect to 





This research study uses several terms and phrases that should be defined for the 
reader.  These definitions are arranged alphabetically according to the chapter in which 
they first appear. 
Junior Officer:  This thesis defines “junior officer” as commissioned officers in the 
United States military between the ranks of, and including, 0-1 (Ensign/ 2nd Lieutenant) 
and 0-4 (Lieutenant Commander/ Major). 
 
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW):  This thesis refers to these simply as 
OOTW. They are operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the 
range of military operations short of war, and can be applied to complement any 
combination of the other instruments of national power.  OOTW focus on deterring war 
and promoting peace (see definition below of ‘war’ for contrast).  They are more 
sensitive to political considerations and the military may, or may not, be the primary 
participant.  Generally, more restrictive rules of engagement and a hierarchy of national 
objectives are followed.  The philosophy behind OOTW is that the use of military forces 
in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of 
major armed conflict or war.  OOTW operations include: humanitarian assistance, 
disaster relief, support of counter-drug ops, arms control, support of US civil authorities, 
noncombatant evacuations, and peacekeeping.  It should also be noted that OOTW 
missions can quickly change from non-combat operations to combat operations and back 
again, or both combat and non-combat ops may take place simultaneously. (Joint Pub 3-
07, 1995, p.vii-viii) 
 
Counter-Drug Ops (Operational):  Support to host nations and drug law enforcement 
agencies involving military personnel and their associated equipment, and provided by 
the geographic combatant commanders from forces assigned to them or made available to 
them by the Services for this purpose. Operations support does not include support in the 
form of equipment alone, nor the conduct of joint law enforcement investigations with 
cooperating civilian law enforcement agencies.  (Joint Publication 1-02, 2000, p.112)  
 
Counter-Drug Ops (Non-Operational):  Support provided to law enforcement 
agencies/host nations that includes loan or lease of equipment without operators, use of 
facilities (such as buildings, training areas, and ranges), training conducted in formal 
schools, transfer of excess equipment, or other support provided by the Services from 
forces not assigned or made available to the combatant commanders. (Joint Publication 1-
02, 2000, p.112) 
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Disaster Relief:  Measures taken before, during, or after hostile action or natural or 
manmade disasters to reduce the probability of damage, minimize its effects, and initiate 
recovery.  Prompt aid used to alleviate the suffering of foreign (and domestic) disaster 
victims. Normally, it includes humanitarian services and transportation; the provision of 
food, clothing, medicine, beds and bedding; temporary shelter and housing; the 
furnishing of medical materiel, medical and technical personnel; and making repairs 
to essential services. (Joint Publication 1-02, 2000, p.142 &183) 
 
Foreign Internal Defense:  Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government 
in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society 
from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.  It focuses on building institutions 
(political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Also called 
FIDs. (Joint Publication 1-02, 2000, p.183) 
 
Humanitarian Assistance:  Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural 
or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, 
or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to 
or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited 
in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement 
the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the 
primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. Also called HA. (Joint 
Publication 1-02, 2000, p.212)  Additionally, these operations may occur domestically 
(ex. Hurricane Hugo relief), or internationally (ex. Operation Support Hope- Rwanda).  
Additionally, these operations can be U.N.- led (planned, paid for, and implemented by 
the U.N.), U.N.-sanctioned (authorized by the Security Council without direct U.N. 
participation), completely independent of the U.N. (GAO NSIAD-95-102BR, 1995, p.4)   
 
Non-Combatant Evacuation: Operations directed by the Department of State, the 
Department of Defense, or other appropriate authority whereby noncombatants are 
evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or 
natural disaster to safe havens or to the United States. Also called NEOs. (Joint 
Publication 1-02, 2000, p.319) 
 
Peace Operations:  The use of military assets to help maintain or restore international 
peace.  Peace operations cover three types of actions: preventive deployment, 
peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. (GAO NSIAD-95-102BR, 1995, p.4)   
 
Preventive Deployment:  The use of military assets to prevent conflict from breaking out.  
An example includes the stationing of military forces in Macedonia to prevent the 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia from spilling across the border. (GAO NSIAD-95-





Peacekeeping: Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a 
dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement 
(ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-
term political settlement. (Joint Publication 1-02, 2000, p.319, 347) 
 
Peace Enforcement :  The use, or threat, of military force to compel countries into 
compliance with international sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.  
An example would be U.S. involvement in Somalia. (GAO NSIAD-95-102BR, 1995, 
p.4)   
 
War:  Large-scale, sustained combat operations to achieve national objectives or to 
protect national interests.  The military is the primary “player,” and the rules of 
engagement are not as restrictive as those in place during OOTW. (Joint Pub 3-07, 1995) 
 
Commitment (attitudinal):  The relative strength of an individual’s identification with and 
involvement in a particular organization characterized by: a) a strong belief in and 
acceptance of organizational goals and values; b) a willingness to exert considerable 
energy on behalf of the organization; and c) a strong desire to maintain organization 
membership (Mowday, Porter & Steers, 1982, p.27) 
 
Job Satisfaction:  A summary indicator routinely used and studied among various work 
attitude variables.  It is commonly used to answer the general question of: do people like 
their work and are they generally getting what they wanted from their jobs? (i.e., are their 
expectations being met in comparison with the actual realities of their job?). (Lincoln & 
Kalleberg, 1990) 
 
Retention:  Refers to reenlistment, extension, or non-attrition in military service. (Brown, 
1991) With respect to military officers, this thesis considers retention to mean the 
continuance of service beyond the officer’s current obligated service period (Example: 
Midshipmen are obligated to five years of military service upon commissioning. Those 
who stay in service beyond their obligated service and accept another obligated service 
term have been “retained” by the organization.) 
 
Turnover:  Either a voluntary (employee initiated) or involuntary (employer initiated) 
“permanent movement beyond the boundary of the organization.” (Macy & Mirvis, 
1983).  This report treats voluntary separation as an employee- initiated decision not to 
renew/extend a service contract beyond the initial commitment period (the initial 
“stay/go” decision point), resulting in a turnover rate.  Involuntary separation refers to 
individuals leaving the military prior to the end of their contracts due to legal proceedings 
or failure to be promoted (“up or out” structure), and is not relevant to this study. 
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E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This study is organized into six chapters.  Chapter II begins with an examination 
of OOTW from a historical and contemporary perspective.  Chapter III examines  
literature discussing the relationship between organizational turnover and employee 
expectations.  The focus here is on the role unmet expectations may play in an 
employee’s decision to stay, or leave, their current employing organization.  Chapter IV 
describes the study methodology of this study, including the research-site, participants, 
and survey instruments.  Chapter V presents a descriptive analysis of the data collected 
from the two surveys.  Chapter VI provides conclusions, implications for policy makers, 
and recommendations for further research.  Finally, Appendix C includes the two surveys 





II.   OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Regardless of the term or phrase used to characterize or categorize the types of 
military missions commonly referred to as Operations Other Than War (OOTW), they 
are not new to the American military, nor are they as “non-traditional” as described in 
much of the literature.  While these missions may not have been a central element in 
defining the American military culture throughout its history, they have been a part of it 
since the very beginning and will likely continue to be in the years ahead.  As Huntington 
(1993) observes: 
There are almost no conceivable roles for the American military in 
this new phase of national security that the American military have not 
performed in some earlier phase.  The true distinction…is not between 
traditional and non-traditional roles but between military and non-military 
roles, or more precisely, between the combat missions of the military and 
the non-combat uses of military force….The purpose of military forces is 
combat, to deter and to defeat the enemies of the United States; that is 
their central mission….The forces created for that mission, however, can 
and throughout our history have been employed in non-combat non-
military uses. (Huntington, 1993, p.39) 
 
As the national interests of American society have changed over the past 225 
years, so, too, have the major missions performed by America’s military.  Huntington 
(1993) has identified five major phases of American defense policy history marked by 
major changes in the national interests of the American people.  The beginning of each 
new phase was brought about by major changes in the international and national security 
environment and was characterized by a corresponding shift in the focus of America’s 
military.  These individual shifts essentially occurred in 1784, 1815, 1898, 1946, and 
1989 (Huntington, 1993).  In each phase the military regularly performed missions 
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unrelated to a military’s primary mission—war fighting. (See Appendix A for a 
comprehensive list of U.S. military operations that fall short of war from 1784-1995.) 
 
1. 1784-1815 (A Military for the Preservation of the United States) 
Prior to 1784, the primary American military role was to secure a fledgling 
nation’s independence from Britain.  Following the Revolutionary War, the first major 
shift in American defense policy occurred as the military was called upon to counter 
various European threats and deter internal conflict aimed at destroying the union and its 
newly-won independence. (Matloff, 1969)  The military’s role in OOTW essentially 
began during this period and included the use of militia forces to suppress the rebellion of 
Daniel Shays during his attack on the Springfield arsenal in 1786, and the quelling of 
insurrection arising from the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794.     
In 1803, the geographic size of the United States was vastly increased through 
Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase.  The Louis and Clark expeditions, as well as several 
undertaken by the Army along the Mississippi and Arkansas Rivers, opened the doorway 
to the West through which thousands of settlers would eventually pour.  Settlement of the 
West brought confrontation with Native Americans and a subsequent plea for protection 
by the settlers.  The Army responded by building forts and facilitating trade with the 
native populations.  The War of 1812 brought about the end of the Napoleonic era and 
with it a subsequent change in the national interest.  With its own independence now 
relatively secure, the second major shift in American defense policy was well under way.  
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 2. 1815-1898 (An Exploratory Military) 
The period from 1815 to 1898 was characterized by the Army’s exploration of the  
present-day western United States, and the Navy’s exploration of the Pacific, Far East, 
and Antarctica.  During this period, the famous explorations of Lieutenant Charles 
Wilkes and Commodore Perry took place.  The Army continued to map the newly 
acquired lands gained from the Mexican-American War, building forts and surveying 
routes for transcontinental railroads.  Meanwhile, the Navy was busy creating trade and 
providing access to the Far East. The Army would later be involved with governing 
occupied areas of the South during Reconstruction and the Alaska territory for ten years 
following its purchase from Russia in 1867.  Both services made major scientific 
advances as well: the Army in meteorology and the Navy in oceanography.  In 1871, the 
services were also called upon to help control the great Chicago fire.  Throughout this 
period, the Army Corps of Engineers remained busy working on the nation’s harbors, 
public buildings, and conducting geologic surveys.  As the 19th century came to an end, 
so, too, did this second phase of American defense policy, focused on exploration and 
expansion. 
3. 1898-1946 (Emergence of a “Big War” Military) 
By 1898, America was beginning to emerge as a major world power in the 
international arena.  America “consigned the Indian-fighting Army and the commerce-
protecting Navy to history and in their stead created an Army designed for big wars and a 
Navy for big battles.” (Huntington, 1993, p.38)  This phase lasted until 1946, and was the 
prevailing defense policy that carried America through the two World Wars. 
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During this period of “big war” defense policy, the military continued to function 
in roles other than as a combat force.  The Army was instrumental in providing assistance 
during the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and eventually led the entire effort, as well as 
providing troops to prevent looting, to distribute food and clothing, and to construct 
shelter.  Military aviation began making contributions in 1919 by airlifting supplies to 
Texas flood victims and rescue workers to mine disasters in the states of California and 
Colorado. (Callander, 1993)  The Army Air Corps also took responsibility for delivering 
airmail in 1934 as commercial contracts were being renegotiated. (Callander, 1993)  One 
of the most uncharacteristic non-combat missions performed by the military in this period 
was administration of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), at the direction of 
President Franklin Roosevelt.  The program, begun in 1933, trained nearly three-million 
men in conservation efforts by the time it ended in 1942, and was generally regarded as a 
successful social program. (Sherraden, 1981) 
In 1940, the Marine Corps showed a great amount of prescience with its 
publication of the The Small Wars Manual (SWM).  The manual was the result of 
experiences gained from several military interventions known collectively as the “Banana 
Wars.”  This was one of the earliest formal attempts to analyze the character and 
requirements of operations that fell short of large-scale war.  The SWM defined these as 
“operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined 
with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose 
government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of such 
interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.” (in Emerald Express 99-




4. 1946-1989 (The Cold War Military) 
 
With the wars in Europe and the Pacific now over, the international political 
centers of power shifted and the national security concerns of the United States 
experienced their fourth major historical shift.  In 1946, America had emerged as a 
superpower in the international arena, as did the Soviet Union.   The two superpowers 
would spend the next forty-five years locked in what would become known as the Cold 
War. 
The first major U.S.-Soviet Union contest occurred in 1948, as the Soviet Union 
moved to cut West Berlin off from the rest of allied-occupied Germany.  The United 
States responded with the “Berlin Airlift.”  The airlift provided millions of pounds of 
food and supplies to the people of Berlin through almost 278,000 flights. (Callander, 
1993)  U.S defense policy was beginning to solidify on the objective of curbing Soviet 
expansion and promoting democracy worldwide.   
Major defining events in this phase included U.S. involvement in the 1948 United 
Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), charged with maintaining an Arab-
Israeli cease-fire.  In 1949, America became part of the Mutual Defense Assistance 
Program, which charged the military with providing equipment and training to a number 
of countries, including Greece, China, the Phillipines, and a number of Latin American 
nations. (Matloff, 1969)  The goal of these programs was to maintain peace and promote 
democracy.  This U.S. policy of “containment” would later take on a new air of 
seriousness with the detonation of a nuclear weapon by the Soviet Union in August 1949.  
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In 1956, the Navy and Marine Corps responded to the Suez Canal incident by 
evacuating approximately 1,500 American civilians from Egypt. (Hagan, 1984)  Army, 
Navy, and Marine Corps forces took part in a 1965 landing in the Dominican Republic to 
protect U.S. citizens and prevent Communist takeover by military revolt.  The troops 
spent 16 months on the island maintaining order and distributing supplies. (Matloff, 
1969)  The 1960s also saw the Air Force actively flying missions in support of 
humanitarian assistance efforts for various flooding, earthquake, and volcanic disasters 
from Alaska to Sicily. 
 Civil unrest in America, due to racial conflicts and anti-war (Vietnam) 
protests during the 1960s and 1970s, found the military called upon to respond to non-
combat operations within its own borders.  For example, in 1965, the National Guard was 
used to bring order following the Watts riot in California, and regular Army troops were 
involved in restoring the peace following the Detroit riot of 1967.  On May Day 1971, 
more than 10,000 Army, Marine, and National Guard troops were called upon to keep 
highways open around Washington, D.C., as demonstrators threatened to prevent 
government employees from traveling to work. (Matloff, 1969) 
The end of the Vietnam War marked a distinct change in the structure of the 
American military, but not its defense strategy.  In 1973 the draft ended, and the All-
Volunteer Force (AVF) was born.  While the AVF brought significant changes to the 
services, it did not affect the direction of the national interest or the policy of  
“containment” that continued to define and justify the military purpose.     
The 1970s brought humanitarian assistance to flood-ravaged Pakistan (1973) and 
Romania (1975).  Military evacuation of civilians was provided in Cyprus (1974), 
 17
Lebanon (1976), and Iran (1978).  Earthquake relief efforts were also provided to 
Guatemala (1975), Turkey (1976), and Algeria (1980).  Domestically, the Air Force was 
used to transport rescue workers and equipment to Kentucky (1977), in the wake of a coal 
mine disaster, and to New York to aid in emergency snow-removal efforts.   
The 1980s brought some increased non-combat roles for the military and greater 
legal limitations upon its use in domestic situations.1  Although the  military had been 
involved in slowing the flow of drugs into the country since the 1960s, it took on a new 
life in the 1980s with President Reagan’s declaration of a “war on drugs.”  The military 
began providing unprecedented levels of logistical and surveillance support to civilian 
law enforcement efforts to stem the drug flow.  These efforts included Air Force 
AWACS flights and Naval ship deployments with embarked Coast Guard personnel to 
conduct boardings of suspected traffickers.  In other civil matters, the military was used 
to replace striking air traffic controllers in 1981.  National Guardsmen filled the void in 
44 of 45 replacement episodes during this strike, and federal troops were used once.  In 
another mission, the U.S. Navy started its Persona l Excellence Partnership Program in 
1985 with the aim of educating the youth of America about the rights and responsibilities 
associated with citizenship.  Navy volunteers supported this role by providing assistance 
through coaching, mentoring, and support of community events. 
The Multinational Force and Observers, rising from the Camp David Accords, 
resulted in the formation of a U.S.- led peacekeeping force in 1980 to ensure Israeli and 
Egyptian compliance with the peace treaty.  Another peacekeeping evolution of the 
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period was the Multi-National Force (MNF) that existed in Lebanon from 1982 to 1984.  
Its role was to prevent violence between two sides in a civil war and assist the Lebanese 
government in regaining national control.  (This MNF involvement would later lead to a 
terrorist attack on the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Lebanon, killing 245 sailors and 
marines.) 
Military disaster response also continued throughout the 1980s.  Some instances 
include the evacuation of terrified people from the Las Vegas MGM Grand Hotel by the 
Air Force following a devastating fire (1980), and the transport of several cargo loads of 
personnel and their equipment to help combat forest fires raging throughout the United 
States in 1988.  In the same year, Army and Marine Corps units were used to help fight 
forest fires in Yellowstone National Park. 
The military continued to promote democracy and to contain communist 
expansion through other “good will” measures, such as the Humanitarian Assistance 
Program (HAP).  This program, authorized in 1985, allowed the military to donate 
excess, non- lethal supplies to other countries.  HAP was responsible for providing 
supplies to Afghanistan rebels in 1986 and Cambodia in 1987. 
5. 1989-Present (The Military and the Policy of Engagement) 
The Berlin Wall fell in 1989, and by the end of 1991 the Soviet Union and 
Warsaw Pact would be resigned to history.  The Cold War had ended, and America was 
the last superpower left standing.  With the disappearance of the “bipolar world,” the 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 The Defense Authorization Act of 1982 defined military assistance that may be 
given to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in the fight against drugs, 
including certain exemptions and modifications to the Posse Comitatus Act. 
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United States was left as the only remaining global, stabilizing force.  And, as 
Schlesinger (1998) observes, America soon became the “world’s policeman”:  
Force deployment in the post-Cold War years, driven by “military 
operations other than war,” has been far more frequent, far larger, and of 
far longer duration than during the Cold War itself.  That is a reflection of 
our expanded foreign policy role and of our willingness, in practice if not 
in theory, regularly to serve as the world’s policeman. 
         (Schlesinger, 1998, p.5) 
 
The 1990s saw the continuation and expansion of missions that did not involve 
war-fighting by the U.S. military.  The armed forces were tasked with greater 
responsibility and commitments to drug enforcement operations in conjunction with civil 
agencies.2  The military also responded to several tides of refugees trying to enter the 
country, including Haitians (31,000) fleeing a military coup in 1991 and Cubans (more 
than 20,000) fleeing the Castro regime in 1994.  Humanitarian demining also became a 
part of the formal services rendered by the U.S. military during this period3.   
Civil-military cooperation programs also experienced an expansion during this 
period.  Legislation introduced by Senator Sam Nunn called for the military to provide 
job training and education efforts that aided local communities without decreasing 
                                                 
2 The Defense Authorization Act of 1989 made the Department of Defense the 
lead agency for surveillance of sea-borne smugglers, and coordinator for C4I functions of 
a the national drug interdiction network. State plans for use of National Guard troops in 
drug enforcement activities were also approved.   
3 Humanitarian demining was a program operated by Department of Defense and 
Department of State personnel charged with educating local populations about mine 
avoidance and assisting government forces with the detection and removal of land mines 
to facilitate the return of refugees and order to areas of former conflict. Examples 
include: Eritrea and Ethiopia, 1994 and Cambodia, 1995. (Brown, 1995, p.79) 
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readiness.  Programs growing out of this legislation included: Starbase Atlantis, Youth 
Conservation Corps, and Civil Air Patrol Falcon Flight Program, among others. 
Domestically, the military responded to disasters ranging from the oil spill of the 
Exxon Valdez in Alaska and the Loma Prieta earthquake in San Francisco to hurricanes 
Hugo (South Carolina, 1989) and Andrew (Florida, 1992).   Internationally, U.S. military 
personnel responded to flooding in Bangladesh (Operation Sea Angel, 1991), earthquakes 
in India (1993), Turkey (2000), and El Salvador (2001), as well as volcanic eruptions in 
Sicily (1996) that threatened several small towns.     
In 1989, peace operations for the United States consisted of the on-going Multi 
National Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai, and the United Nations- led Middle 
East peacekeeping mission (UNTSO).  Between 1989 and 1995, U.S. military personnel 
would be involved in eight  
U.N. peace operations. (Brown, 1995)  American service members would further 
be employed in Panama, Iraq and Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, East Timor, Bosnia and 
Macedonia, Kosovo, Libya, and Liberia.  In addition, the United States continued to 
maintain its presence in the Sinai, Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Europe. (Reed & Segal, 
2000) 
When the Berlin Wall came down, a nation formerly devoted to “containing” the 
Soviet threat now had to adapt to supporting a peacetime military oriented toward an 
increasing number of other, less easily defined threats. (Reed & Segal, 2000)  The 
international landscape had once again profoundly changed.  The national interests of the 
United States and its defense policy would subsequently undergo major changes as well.  
The new perceived threats that emerged were sub-national.  Western democracies shifted 
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focus from preventing conflict between states (inter-state), as was the case prior to and 
during the Cold War, to preventing conflict within states (intra-state). (Moskos, Williams 
& Segal, 2000)  This new direction reflected a fundamental shift from a homeland 
defense, to one of multinational peacekeeping and humanitarian missions for the United 
States.  No longer would the American military be focused upon the deterrence or 
containment of a single threat.  Rather, it would now focus on preventing the emergence 
of new threats.  This new policy characterizing recent U.S. involvement in the 
international arena since the Cold War has been described as “engagement.”   
According to former President Clinton’s 1995 National Security Strategy, the 
primary mission of the U.S. military is to deter and, if necessary, engage in conflicts in 
which the interests of the United States are threatened.  To support this strategy, the U.S. 
has adopted a defense strategy that calls for the maintenance of  “robust and flexible” 
military forces that can perform a multitude of missions.  The National Security Strategy, 
as well as other defense planning documents (e.g., Report of the Commission on Roles 
and Missions, 1995) identified peace operations as integral to the roles of all the services 
and among the missions the U.S. armed forces must be prepared to undertake. (GAO 
NSIAD-96-14, 1995)  The following quote from former Secretary of the Army, Louis 
Calderra (Caldera and Echevarria, 2001) illustrates the current American defense policy 
focus of “engagement” through the execution of non-combat operations in the post-Cold 
War world: 
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While some will argue otherwise, the United States must remain 
engaged in the world in order to continue to contribute to the spread of 
freedom and democracy and to promote economic prosperity. We are, 
after all, a global power with global interests and responsibilities.  As 
such, we require a global national security strategy that integrates all the 
dimensions of national power. 
…The many things that we do on a day-to-day basis to give our 
principles and ideals life in the international arena including the use of our 
military in humanitarian, peacekeeping, counter-drug, and other stability 
and support operations contribute greatly to our national security by 
ameliorating the very crises that can lead to larger conflicts.  They convey 
our values to the world in a manner that is concrete and unmistakable. 
(Calderra & Echevarria, 2001, p.32) 
            
This historical review of U.S. military involvement in operations that do not 
involve war- fighting is, by no means, exhaustive4.  It is simply meant to establish the 
fact that the armed forces of the United States have consistently and routinely performed 
roles and missions outside of solely fighting the nation’s wars.  At times during our 
nation’s history, these missions had even been the primary focus and role for the armed 
forces. (Brown, 1995)  Based upon this history, these missions are certainly not as “non-
traditional” as they have commonly been called. (Huntington, 1993)  They have been, 




                                                 
4 A comprehensive study detailing the history of OOTW can be found in John R. 




B. OPERATIONAL IMPACT  
 
The broad spectrum of new threats regularly requiring an American response 
increased dramatically during the 1990s, and America responded in accordance with this 
policy.  The competence with which the military responded to these threats appears to 
have further encouraged its use by national command authorities.  The resultant effect 
was an extremely high operation tempo (OPTEMPO) for the services as they attempted 
to meet the growing challenges to global security.  The 1990s, in particular, have seen a 
300-percent increase in military overseas deployments.  In the case of the Army, for 
example, a recent report showed 34,000 soldiers (including reservists) on temporary duty 
in 81 different countries. (Schlesinger, 1998)  In addition, the extended length of some 
peacekeeping operations necessitates that the original unit deployed be relieved at some 
point by replacements.  Therefore, for every unit involved in these operations, there is 
likely to be another that has just returned and is recovering, as well as a third that is 
“ramping-up” to go. (CBO, 2000) 
As national policymakers began to address the new security environment 
following the Cold War, they concluded a major force reduction was possible in the U.S. 
military.  This so-called “peace dividend” resulted in a significant downsizing of the 
Department of Defense (DoD).  Between 1989 and 1999, active-duty military personnel 
and civilian DoD employees were cut by 34 percent, and defense spending was reduced 
by 38 percent.   Some reserve units experienced a 26-percent decrease in manpower.  The 
force structure itself was also dramatically trimmed: the number of active Army divisions 
declined from 18 to 10, Navy ships decreased from 566 to 317, and fighter wings in the 
Air Force declined from 37 to 20. (CBO, 2000) 
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The redefinition in American defense policy, increased deployments, force 
restructuring, and a shrinking defense budget have, together, pushed the American 
military into a situation of having to “do more, with less.”  The net effect has been an 
extremely high OPTEMPO that the individual services are maintaining with great 
difficulty and at a higher long-run cost to readiness, morale, and personnel retention. 
(Schlesinger, 1998)  While operations other than war-fighting are essential to the national 
interest, they have affected combat readiness and caused uncertainty with respect to the 
focus of the military. (CSIS, 2000)  The degree to which these “operations other than 
war” detract or enhance the military’s ability to wage and win war is the subject of some 
debate.  The effect of these operations on the military’s war-fighting capabilities has 
produced mixed results and been situationally dependent.  The impact has also been far 
greater on some units than upon others.  Certain types of units are normally called upon 
more often than others in these types of operations, including Army support services and 
special operations forces, military police, and certain specialized aircraft units from the 
Air Force involved in reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering.  These particular forces 
are few in number with respect to the service as a whole; and, therefore, these units are 
deployed more often and for longer periods with shorter recovery times before being 
deployed again.  In addition, many of these units come from the Reserve Force, as many 
of the required specialties have no active-duty equivalent.   
Other factors affecting combat capabilities included: the type of peace operation, 
the type of unit participating, the length of participation, and in-theater training 
opportunities.  According to the Department of Defense, the greatest negative impacts of 
participating in a peace operation come from removing a unit from its normal training 
 25
cycle, increased maintenance on systems, and consecutive deployments that can reduce 
morale. (GAO NSIAD-96-14)  At the same time, peace operations have given the United 
States military valuable experience in joint and coalition operations and have provided 
valuable training in the same missions some military personnel would execute in war.  
(GAO NSIAD-95-102BR)   
 
C. OUTLOOK:  FUTURE DEFENSE POLICY 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of a new “world 
order,” nations and non-nation states that are unwilling or unable to match the United 
States head-on in a military confrontation are relying increasingly on asymmetrical 
means to challenge the world’s only superpower.  Also, in an increasingly interconnected 
global community, “ethnic cleansing” and other internal problems of foreign nations are 
likely to provoke U.S. policy makers into response.  Their response has been a policy of 
engagement and intervention with the goal of keeping tensions between nations below the 
threshold of major armed conflict or war.  As a result, OOTW have become more the 
norm, and in many cases subsumed traditiona l military missions. (Wheatley, 1995) 
In the future, the military can expect to perform its primary 
mission of preparing to fight and win the nation’s wars, as well as the 
numerous other operations that fall short of war itself.  Future missions 
will continue to include domestic activities, humanitarian assistance at 
home and abroad, and peacekeeping.  The following quote, by former 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John M. Shalikashvili, 
appears in the military joint forces doctrine manual on OOTW (Joint Pub 
3-07) and gives insight as to the future focus of American defense policy: 
While we have historically focused on warfighting, our military 
profession is increasingly changing its focus to a complex array of military 
operations—other than war….Participation in MOOTW is critical in the 
changing international security environment.  Although the goals and 
endstates may not be crystal clear, you (military commanders) should 
spare no effort in planning and executing MOOTW.  Your support of 
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national security interests in today’s challenging environment is as crucial 
as it is in war. (Shalikashivili, 1995, npg.)  
 
The nation’s top civilian defense leaders have also given some indication as to the 
future direction of American defense policy and the central role of non-combat operations 
in executing that policy.  The following comments by Calderra and Echevarria (2001) 
provides some insight as to what the military services may expect in the near future: 
Indeed, if current trends are any indication, the years ahead may be 
characterized more by a general condition of conflict than by war in the 
traditional sense, especially as the world works to bridge some of its more 
challenging economic, ethnic, and ideological divisions. 
…In short, the nation needs a strategy that has global perspective 
and that focuses on creating positive conditions that could prevent or 
preempt conflict…. 
Considering the security challenges that lie ahead and the current 
shortfalls in strategic resources, America’s new leadership will have some 
tough decisions to make. Those decisions will determine the successes or 
sacrifices that the young men and women serving in the military uniforms 
of our nation will experience tomorrow. (Calderra & Echevarria, 2001, 
p.15) 
 
For these reasons, the U.S. military will likely continue its long heritage of 
involvement in OOTW now and well into the future. 
 
D. PERSONAL EXPECTATIONS 
Since the early 1990s, the military’s increasing involvement in OOTW has led to 
questions concerning the impact of that involvement on an organizational culture that has 
historically embraced a “warrior” ethos.  In 1964, Morris Janowitz first remarked that 
military personnel would most likely reject the idea of the armed forces acting as a 
constabulary force, based upon the notion that the constabulary concept eliminates the 
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distinction between peacetime and wartime roles, drawing more on a police mentality 
than a military one.  Janowitz further maintained that the American military typically 
resists identifying itself with this concept, and thinking of the constabulary role as “less 
prestigious and less honorable tasks.” (Reed & Segal, 2000)  The military’s difficulty in 
resolving the conflict between its traditional “warrior” culture and an increasing 
involvement in non-combat operations has significantly affected its forces all the way 
down to the individual level.  This impact upon the forces is exemplified in the following 
comments of a junior officer and a news correspondent, respectively: 
We give soldiers expectations about doing exciting fighting-type 
stuff, and then we send them off to ‘peace-keep’ without fully explaining 
their mission to them. 
      -A junior officer in a letter to the New York Times (April, 2000) 
 
For many, the frustration they felt while in the military was a 
factor in their decision to exit. They complain of confusing missions and 
long deployments away from home—assignments that require expertise 
they neither trained nor entered the military for. (Yablonka, 2000, p.14) 
 
A study conducted by Reed and Segal (2000) examined the attitudes of soldiers 
with respect to peacekeeping.  Specifically, the study focused on the 10th Mountain 
Division of the U.S. Army located at Fort Drum, New York.  A survey was administered 
in February-March 1995 after the unit had returned from Haiti, and garnered 522 
voluntary responses from across the different units comprising the division.  Dozens of 
soldiers also participated in group interviews.   
The researchers found that “despite feelings that peacekeeping is a soldierly role,” 
soldiers questioned “whether it [peacekeeping] is good for their careers and their units.” 
(Reed & Segal, 2000, p.70)  Also, while most soldiers thought that peacekeeping is an 
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appropriate military mission, a significant minority did not.  And, as the number of 
deployments increased, soldiers reported lower morale. 
A separate study by Avant and Lebovic (2000) also looked at military attitudes 
toward post-Cold War missions.  The study surveyed U.S. military officers (546) enrolled 
in command and staff colleges across the different services in 1996 -19975.  The survey 
was aimed at uncovering respondents’ opinions on different, general classes of missions.  
With the Soviet threat absent for over ten years, the study sought to discover whether 
“U.S. military attitudes continue to reflect a focus on traditional, high- intensity military 
contingencies? Or, have officers begun to accept new missions such as peace 
enforcement, drug interdiction, antiterrorism and the like?” (Avant & Lebovic, 2000, 
p.37) 
The results of the study by Avant and Lebovic (2000) suggested that, overall, 
officers found traditional missions (fighting a general or regional war) most appropriate 
for their service.  Additionally, these officers tended to view nontraditional missions 
(drug enforcement, peacekeeping, peace and sanctions enforcement, and humanitarian 
assistance) as least fitting for their service.  While the officers ranked missions according 
to traditional military values, there was no evidence to suggest that strong opposition for 
any of them existed.  Further, while all officers believed traditional missions were most 
appropriate, those with combat roles (e.g., warfare-qualified officers) indicated a higher 
                                                 
5 The command and staff colleges included the following: Air Command and 
Staff College; U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College; College of Naval 
Command and Staff; U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; and the Armed 
Forces Staff College.  
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level of support for war-fighting missions than did officers with non-combat roles (e.g., 
staff officers). 
In a recent study conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS), 11,680 military personnel worldwide were given the Ulmer-Cambell Military 
Climate/Culture Survey (MCCS).  The respondents included Army (active and reserve 
components), Marine Corps, and Coast Guard personnel from operational units.  A 
similar survey (MCCS Staff) was given to 819 personnel in single-service or joint staffs 
worldwide.6  In addition, CSIS analysts conducted more than 125 focus groups to further 
enhance the climate-survey data.  Together, these data sources led to several findings.  
One of the findings from the CSIS study was an understanding of the 
psychological impact upon soldiers and sailors when they expect and train for a specific 
type of mission and then find themselves engaged in a different mission type.  
Specifically, when a mission role does not permit individuals to train in, or exercise their 
basic combat operational capabilities (such as in peacekeeping or humanitarian 
assistance), a stressful, internal, personal conflict can result.  One’s combat mission 
specialty is generally the reason the military member joined the service in the first place.  
Therefore, military personnel in the performance of their duties in non-combat missions 
may comment to the generalized effect as follows: “We are doing some good work for 
these people, but I joined the military to be in a combat-ready unit, not to be a 
policeman.”  The CSIS (2000) report expands on this theme: 
                                                 
6 MCCS Staff respondents included relatively senior officers and enlisted 
personnel due to the nature of manning high- level staffs, and more than half the 
respondents were of the rank 0-4 or higher. 
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The increased tasking of the U.S. military in OOTW has 
challenged the services’ focus on traditional combat, the armed forces’ 
primary responsibility. Peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and 
humanitarian operations have forced many military units to train at least 
temporarily to different skills and standards. Although some units felt 
these operations provided solid training and good leadership experience 
for junior officers and NCOs, retraining after peacekeeping operations was 
necessary to meet rigorous combat readiness standards. Ambiguity in 
basic missions can lower expectations for competence in traditional 
primary skills. Although OOTW may well be in the national interest, a 
dilution of the focus on combat operations can have a cultural impact. 
Peacekeeping operations have broadened the myriad tasks that 
many military units must master, contributed to deployment fatigue, 
created competition for scarce resources, and could alter the essence of the 
military profession. None of that argues that they should not be 
undertaken. Instead it argues that the national command authority and the 
services need to understand better the considerable costs of such 
operations and the ways to mitigate against potentially negative impacts 
on the underlying military culture. (CSIS, 2000, p.xxii) 
 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Regardless of the term or phrase for the types of military missions commonly 
referred to as Operations Other Than War, or OOTW, they are not new to the American 
military, nor are they as “non-traditional” as many may think.  There exists a long 
tradition in the United States military of having consistently and routinely performed 
roles and missions outside of solely fighting the nation’s wars. (Huntington, 1993)  At 
times during our nation’s history, OOTW had even been the  primary focus and role for 
the armed forces. (Brown, 1995)  OOTW are not new to the U.S. military, but have 
simply taken on an increasingly more prominent and central role in national and 
international security plans in the past few years.  The collapse of the Soviet Union and 
rise of asymmetrical threats to international and U.S. security have led to a greater 
reliance upon OOTW as a more significant part of national defense policy to prevent or 
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minimize conflicts around the globe before they escalate to the point of war.  The 
competence with which the military responded to America’s policy of “engagement” 
appears to have further encouraged its use by national command authorities resulting in 
an extremely high operation tempo, or OPTEMPO.  
The pace of the military’s OPTEMPO shows no signs of relaxing, and, in the 
future, the military can expect to not only perform its primary mission of preparing to 
fight and win the nation’s wars, but also be engaged in many operations that fall short of 
war.  Personal expectations of individual service members, however, appear to differ 
from the realities of the missions they are increasingly called upon to perform.  The 
results of several studies suggest that military service members have expectations that 
center on training for and fighting big wars with clearly defined enemies.  The reality of 
their involvement in OOTW, however, does not appear entirely congruent with these 
expectations.  The following chapter explores the significance and impact of unmet 
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III.   EXPECTATIONS AND THE EMPLOYEE-JOB MISMATCH 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Everyone has expectations to some degree or another upon entering a new 
situation or organization, and these expectations likely differ from individual to 
individual.  So what shapes or creates these personal expectations?  Mowday and Steers 
(1981) developed a model in which they believed expectations are influenced by three 
factors: 1) individual characteristics, 2) available information about the job and 
organization, and 3) alternative job opportunities7.  They believed the influence of these 
factors upon one’s expectations would ultimately affect the individual employee’s 
decision to stay or leave.  (The third factor, alternate job opportunities, is considered 
outside the scope of this thesis and is not discussed here.) 
The Mowday and Steers model depicts individual characteristics (education, age, 
previous work experience, etc.) leading to conscious or subconscious decisions 
concerning what the potential employee expects from a job.  Job descriptions and other 
available information on organizations were also depicted as having a direct impact upon 
the expectations formulated by an individual prior to organizational entry and during 
times of reassessment throughout an individual’s career.  As the authors state:  
For instance, it has been found fairly consistently that when people are provided 
more complete or more accurate information about prospective jobs, they are able to 
make more informed choices, and as a result, are more likely to develop realistic job 
                                                 
7 See Appendix B for Mowday & Steers’ model.  
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expectations that are more easily met by the organization.  (Mowday, Porter & Steers, 
1982, p.125) 
This premise of providing accurate job information to potential employees  
with the hope of developing more realistic job expectations in them has been adopted by 
the military.  The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark, wants to improve 
retention in the Navy by aligning the expectations of sailors more closely with the 
realities of their service.  The premise that aligning sailors’ expectations more closely 
with actual job conditions (realities) will result in greater retention through increased 
organizational commitment is not new a concept, but one that has been increasingly 
explored over the past few years. 
 
B. RESEARCH HISTORY: ATTITUDINAL STUDIES 
The response of workers to their jobs has a long research history.  Many studies 
have been devoted to research in various public and private management fields, including 
industrial and organizational psychology and public administration.  These studies have 
tended to focus on the worker’s job satisfaction, level of organizational commitment, and 
the connection of these factors to retention of employees in organizations.  Some studies 
have further suggested that job attitudes at the time of a person’s employment can 
influence later organizational turnover8.  These studies routinely cited the personal 
characteristics brought by an individual to the organization as influencing the person’s 
                                                 
8 “Turnover” is used in a broad sense here to simply describe the leaving behavior 
of employees when they sever association with an organization.  
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subsequent attitudes and behavior–and thus whether the individual stays or leaves the 
organization (Lee, Ashford, Walsh & Mowday, 1994). 
The most common method used within industrial/organizational (I/O) psychology 
studies for measuring organizational commitment and job satisfaction has been a 
comparison of attitudinal responses from the “stayers” and “leavers” of a particular 
organization.  
The role of expectations with respect to organizational turnover has been the 
subject of several studies over the years.  These studies have generally focused on the 
outcomes of organizational commitment (long-term) including: job performance, tenure, 
absenteeism, tardiness, and turnover.  This thesis focuses exclusively on turnover9 and its 
possible relationship with employee expectations. 
Many of the studies examined for the thesis found that “employees who enter 
organizations with more realistic expectations are less likely to leave voluntarily than 
employees whose expectations are unrealistic.” (Mowday et al., 1982, p.51)  Others have 
shown a positive relationship between the commitment levels of employees (those having 
been on the job for some time) and the degree to which employees felt the job met their 
expectations. (Buchanan, 1974; Steers, 1977).      
Grusky (1966) first proposed that organizational commitment may possibly be 
related to the extent that employee expectations in the workplace were met or unmet.  
                                                 
9 While tenure may also appear to be related to retention, there is question as to 
the casual relationship between tenure and organizationa l commitment.  It is unclear 
whether strong commitment leads to increased tenure in an organization, or whether 
increased tenure leads to changes in commitment levels? (Mowday, Porter & Steers, 
1982) 
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Lefkowitz (1971) believed turnover was related to an employee’s initial expectations 
concerning the nature of the job.  It was the work of Porter and Steers in 1973, however, 
that focused attention upon the importance of unmet expectations in the turnover process.  
They reviewed over 60 studies examining employee turnover and came to view “job 
satisfaction as the sum of an individual’s met expectations on the job. The more an 
individual’s expectations are met, the greater the satisfaction.” (Mowday et al., 1982, 
p.114)  Porter & Steers proposed that employees essentially expect a job to have certain 
features (e.g., pay, promotion, tasks) that the employees individually value more or less, 
and that there will always be differences between expected and experienced values.  If 
the difference between these values is large, or increases, the effect will be increased job 
dissatisfaction and a subsequently greater probability for leaving the organization.  Thus, 
the end result would be higher organizational turnover. 
  In 1979, Muchinsky and Tuttle found strong supporting evidence for the Porter-
Steers unmet expectations- leave proposition.  Muchinsky and Tuttle reviewed 150 studies 
and found that met expectations resulted in a reduction of turnover.  The authors also 
introduced the concept of realistic job previews to reduce organizational turnover. 
 
C. RESEARCH HISTORY: BEHAVIORIAL STUDIES 
Mobley, Griffeth, Hand and Meglino (1979) also conducted an extensive review 
of the literature and identified several variables that they thought determined turnover.  
Their model was one of the earliest focusing on the behavioral intention to stay or leave 
an organization, rather than looking at solely attitudinal responses.  The model 
recognized the role of employee expectations on the turnover process as one of the 
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influencing variables, but unlike the attitudinal studies of both Porter and Steers (1973) 
and Muchinsky and Tuttle (1979), Mobley et al. felt the expectation-turnover relationship 
was weak. 
Other behavioral scientists since Mobley et al. have also looked at the role of 
unmet expectations in the workplace and found it to be a determining force with regard to 
organizational withdrawal and turnover (McEnvoy & Cascio, 1985; Bottger, 1990; 
Pearson, 1995).  In fact, Bottger (1990) revealed, through a study of 1,024 nurses, the 
presence or absence of employee-preferred job characteristics substantially affected 
turnover. 
Hopkins (1983) took both an attitudinal and behavioral look at worker reactions to 
their jobs.  She believed the responses of employees toward their work were mainly 
attitudinal and “may or may not have behavioral manifestations in the work setting.” 
(Hopkins, 1983, p.5)  Hopkins’ proposition is that all jobs have a certain context within 
which employees perform tasks, and it is this context as well as the very nature of tasks 
that directly affect the worker.  Another force acting upon the worker’s expectations is 
the individual orientations and attitudes each worker brings to the job.  Hopkins 
examined an individual’s psychological orientation (life view and organizational 
commitment), job orientation (occupational status, mobility, education, length of service, 
and attitudes toward working), and personal attributes (age, sex, and race).  She 
hypothesized that prior orientations and attributes (including previous experience) that 
workers bring to a job affect their expectations or predispositions concerning their new 
roles and organization.  The results of her findings were mixed.  One finding, however, 
was that individual orientations appear to act as “predispositional factors or as 
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conditioners of job attitudes.” (Hopkins, 1983, p.118)  In other words, expectations vary 
from employee to employee and the degree to which they are aligned with the realities of 
the job may lead to either job satisfaction or dissatisfaction. 
 
D. RESEARCH HISTORY: OTHER STUDIES 
In a 1984 thesis entitled “Analysis of Early Military Attrition Behavior,” Richard 
Buddin conducted an examination of enlisted personnel using a learning or experience 
model of job separation. 10  The data for this study were derived from a matched file of 
the 1979 Survey of Personnel Entering Active Duty (AFEES survey) and the Services’ 
Enlisted Master and Loss files.  The AFEES survey collected information at the time of 
enlistment on recruits’ education and work background, as well as their expectations for 
military life.  The match with the Enlisted Master and Loss file limited the data to only 
those recruits who also finished their initial service contract.  
One of Buddin’s hypotheses was that the greater the uncertainty of an employee 
about the nature of a job, the greater the possibility of an employee-job mismatch and 
eventual separation.  His basic premise was that job separation was a response to 
unfavorable working conditions when compared with an employee’s expectations.  
According to Buddin, recruits who are not knowledgeable about the military, 
qualifications for specific jobs in the military, or the type of job they desire will be less 
                                                 
10 Job-matching models attempt to explain worker separation in terms of 
imperfect or uncertain information between the employee and employer.  The employee 
and employer enter into a “contract” because each expects a mutually beneficial match. 
As new information becomes available, the “contract” undergoes a reassessment by both 
sides. During the reassessment, if either side finds the match no longer beneficial, a 
process of job separation will occur, initiated by the disillusioned party. 
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capable of discriminating among the jobs available.  This situation would likely lead to 
an employee-job mismatch and precipitate early organizational separation.   
Using multivariate analysis, however, Buddin found no significant contribution of 
various military job-match indicators upon early attrition.  Specifically, “no t qualifying 
for the desired kind of job and pre-enlistment knowledge of job qualifications–did not 
alter the likelihood of early attrition….”  He further concluded: “Recruits whose interests 
are redirected into unexpected or less desired occupations because of aptitude or service 
requirements are no more attrition-prone than those who get their first occupational 
choice.” (Buddin, 1984, p.51) 
In should be noted, especially in the military, occupational characteristics are not 
generally fixed and may change during a service member’s tenure.  Especially today, the 
workplace environment has become increasingly dynamic, as organizations are under 
tremendous market pressures to maintain a competitive advantage through alignment and 
empowerment of their employees.  The job conditions prevailing at the time of 
organizational entry will likely be different several months or years later.  The changes 
occurring within one’s workplace over time establish a new set of conditions and work 
reality that the jobholder will experience as either met or unmet expectations (Humphrey, 
1991; Bennis, 1992; Pearson, 1995).  The changes will either decrease or increase the gap 
between the worker’s expectations and the actual realities of the job itself, bringing on a 
process of reassessment between the employee and organization concerning the relative 
“match.”  This reassessment will result in a decision to either stay or leave, and thus 
increase or decrease the rate of employee turnover in the organization. 
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A 1992 study by Ashford, Lee, Mowday, & Walsh examined the importance of 
individual employee attributes and experiences in the turnover process using a 
longitudinal study conducted at the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA).  Using 
Mowday’s commitment propensity11 variable, the authors believed the expectations 
brought by newcomers to the organization served as a frame of reference when 
evaluating their new experiences (i.e., newcomers entering with positive expectations 
would be, theoretically, more likely to interpret their new experiences as consistent with 
their own prior beliefs).                         
 Ashford et al. discovered commitment propensity positively correlated to 
subsequent organizational commitment; and, personal factors influenced the development 
of that same organizational commitment, which was found to be a strong predictor of 
turnover.  The results suggested that cadets entering USAFA with higher commitment 
propensity developed and maintained stronger organizational commitment than did those 
who entered with a lower commitment propensity.   Similarly, it was found that initial 
commitment to USAFA positively correlated with subsequent commitment.  Statistically, 
the authors found that for an increase of one standard deviation in initial commitment, the  
                                                 
11 Commitment Propensity was defined as the sum of three components: personal 
characteristics, expectations, and organizational choice factors (Mowday et al., 1982). 
Expectations were measured using three survey items: 1) How much would you say you 
know about what it means to be an Air Force Cadet? 2) I have a good idea about what the 
Academy will be like; and 3) I think I have a pretty good idea about what the Air Force is 
really like. 
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probability of voluntary turnover decreased by approximately 66 percent 12.  The 
significance of this study rested upon the assertion by its authors that USAFA was a 
naturally isolated study site, providing a relatively homogenous environment for the 
assessment of personal characteristics on turnover (Pearson, 1995). 
 Pearson’s own study (1995) of railway track maintenance crews provided further 
support for the Porter and Steers (1973) unmet expectations- leave proposition.  Pearson 
found:  FORMAT 
When the new set of work arrangements, that had different work 
values,were mooted and then installed, the extent of organizational 
withdrawal increased significantly. It is presumed that the qualities of 
these new work arrangements were ill matched with the expectations job 
holders held in the ‘old’ job. Later,when the new situational features 
became relatively well established the turnover rate stabilized. (Pearson, 
1995, p.414) 
 
He reported that the crews wrestled with the known properties of the historical 
“old job” and the emerging new job characteristics.  They underwent a process of 
attempting to reconcile their old expectations with the new realities of their current job 
requirements.  Crewmembers who were unsuccessful in their reconciliation effort left the 
organization, and those who remained experienced anxiety and uncertainty as they 
adjusted to the new nature of their job.  The crewmembers who decided to stay with the 
organization also reported higher variable scores in his study (i.e., their job expectations 
were more closely met then those choosing to leave the organization).  Pearson later 
                                                 
12 Ashford et al. argued that despite the apparent statistical association between 
initial commitment and turnover, their analysis does not allow for a pronouncement of 
causation, but rather only one of association. Also, if their results are generalized then 
knowledge of one’s initial commitment may allow for predicting future staying or leaving 
within the organization.  
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mentioned, “a most illuminating finding was that crew members had an extensive variety 
of job expectations….From the several crew meetings it was evident that the employees 
held numerous job expectations….” (Pearson, 1995, p. 416)  This added support to 
Hopkins’ (1983) assertion that workers possess a variety of individual attitudes and 
orientations, including expectations, affecting whether they stay in or leave an 
organization. 
The development of labor market theory brought new insights into the role unmet 
expectations in the workplace play upon employee behavior in terms of job selection and 
retention.  Ehrenberg and Smith (1994) noted a decrease in the rate of organizational 
“leavers” as job tenure increased.  The authors attribute this to greater alignment between 
the worker’s expectations and actual job conditions the longer they remain in the 
organization.  If the worker’s newly acquired knowledge about the realities of the job did 
not match his/her expectations, then the worker would realize a bad match had been made 
and would be more likely to quit and seek employment elsewhere.  That is, the employee 
would attempt to establish a better job expectation-reality match elsewhere, to bring 
greater alignment between his/her expectations and actual conditions.  
 
E. RESEARCH HISTORY: REALISTIC JOB PREVIEWS 
Realistic Job Previews (RJPs), as mentioned earlier, were introduced first by 
Muchinsky and Tuttle (1979) as a means to help organizations improve the employee-job 
match process and thus reduce subsequent turnover.   The basic RJP hypothesis is 
essentially that a new employee, after becoming aware of both the positive and the 
negative aspects of a certain job prior to organizational entry, has more realistic job 
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expectations, and thus demonstrates a greater degree of commitment to the organization, 
resulting in lower turnover.  As Brose (1999, p.25) writes:  
An RJP is a means by which applicants, or recent hires, are exposed to the 
requirements of their new job. As opposed to the interview process, which 
is often used as a means of selling the position, RJPs do not merely 
emphasize the positive aspects. Rather, they are intended to give the 
candidate a more balanced view of the job. This includes exposure to 
characteristics of the job that might be considered objectionable….RJPs, 
by introducing some of the less desirable job factors, reduce what may 
otherwise be unrealistic expectations. 
 
 
In 1988, a military-specific study of RJPs was conducted by Meglino, DeNisi, 
Youngblood and Williams.  The experiment was performed on 533 Army recruits during 
basic training13.  The study used four experimental conditions in preparing recruits: 1) a 
“reduction preview” (designed to reduce overly positive expectations), 2) an 
“enhancement preview” (designed to reduce overly pessimistic expectations), 3) both 
“reduction” and “enhancement” previews, or 4) neither.  The hypothesis was that 
turnover would be the lowest for the group receiving both previews, since the recruits’ 
expectations would be more closely aligned with actual employment conditions; turnover 
would be higher for the reduction-preview-only group, followed by the enhancement-
preview-only group; and, finally, the control group (no RJP) would experience the 
highest rate of turnover among all groups. (Meglino et al., 1988).  The results, however, 
                                                 
13 According to Brose (1999), a literature review revealed no instances of RJPs in 
the military given before an contractual obligation has been established.  He believes that 
the military fears exposing potential recruits to “the more objectionable qualities of 
military life” because it would make the recruiting effort that much more difficult. 
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showed that, while the group receiving both previews did experience the lowest turnover, 
the control group did not experience the highest rate of turnover.  
Specifically, the results showed that the reduction-preview-only group exhibited 
the highest turnover (13.2 percent), followed by the control group (7.8 percent), then the 
enhancement-only group (5.3 percent), and finally the “both” preview group  
(2.5 percent).  Although these results were unexpected, based upon their initial 
hypotheses, Meglino et al. believed the results were, nonetheless, useful and reasonable. 
As Meglino et al. (1988) writes:  
 
 Those individuals who are most committed (reduction group) to an   
organization before they learn the “truth” about their job, may also be 
those who become the most disillusioned, and therefore more likely to  
leave, when the job does not live  up to their expectations, or when they  
discover that the organization has been less than truthful (organizational 
credibility). (quoted in Brose, 1999, p.50) 
 
The significance of the study by Meglino et al. was derived mainly from the 
results of the group receiving both the “reduction” and “enhancement” previews.  
Turnover was not only the lowest for this group (as originally hypothesized), but the 
results were significant regardless of which groups were used for comparison.  Basically, 
over-exaggerating either positive or negative job aspects could have negative  
repercussions (i.e., turnover and loss of organizational credibility) when the realities of 
the job are discovered (Brose, 1999).   
It appears quite possible that the use of realistic job previews may lead to a 
greater sense of job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and, subsequently, lower 
turnover by closing the expectation-reality gap.  
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In a 1997 Master’s thesis entitled “U.S. Marine Corps Company-Grade Officer 
Retention,” Marc Zinner used multivariate analysis to examine data from the 1992 
Department of Defense Survey of Officers, Enlisted Personnel, and their Spouses.  The 
study focused upon several internal and external work-related factors believed to 
influence retention.  Specifically, the internal factors examined included: intrinsic and 
extrinsic job satisfiers, advancement opportunities, and met expectations.  The “met 
expectations” variable (METEX) was derived from a survey question that asked officers 
whether or not the military had lived up to their preconceived expectations.  It was 
believed, based upon previous research studies, if military service met the officers’ 
original expectations, then they would be more likely to stay in service.  Zinner 
concluded that junior officers should be provided with RJPs of the service communities 
they were considering entering.  In doing so, the officers would have more realistic 
expectations about “military life” and a lower likelihood of leaving service. 
 
F. JOB SATISFACTION IN THE MILITARY 
 A General Accounting Office (GAO) report, Preliminary Results of DOD’s 1999 
Survey of Active Duty Members, concluded that job satisfaction and intent to stay in the 
military were strongly linked.  In fact, the DOD survey showed that approximately 73 
percent of the personnel who said they were satisfied with the military were likely to 
stay; this compared with only 20 percent of personnel who said they were dissatisfied 
with the military and were likely to stay.  In other words, satisfied military service 
members were more likely then dissatisfied members to remain in the organization. 
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Given the relationship between job satisfaction and turnover in the military, it 
becomes obvious that any steps to increase the job satisfaction of service members must 
be considered.  It appears the use of RJPs is one such approach.  RJPs could possibly 
have the combined effect of forcing early, less-expensive turnover by causing those 
poorly matched for military service to come to the realization sooner, rather than later, 
that military service is not in their best interest, while simultaneously improving the 
person-job match for others at the outset of employment.  The result would be a force less 
affected by dissatisfaction with job conditions, more committed to their occupation and 
organization, and less likely to voluntarily leave the military. (Brose, 1999) 
  
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
 This chapter reviewed literature on turnover in the workplace.  Specifically, the 
literature addressing the role of expectations in the turnover process is examined.  The 
role of unmet expectations is discussed with respect to job attitudes such as work 
satisfaction and its impact on an employee’s decision to stay or leave an organization.  
These attitudinal studies led to the later development of behavioral studies and theoretical 
models of the turnover process.  One such theoretical model, developed by Mowday and 
Steers (1982), provides some insight into the relationship between expectations and the 
organizational “stay/leave” decision process.  Finally, studies examining the use of RJPs 
were discussed with respect to their impact on the expectations of new recruits/employees 
entering an organization and personnel turnover.  The next chapter discusses the 
methodology used in the present study. 
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IV.   METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of this research is to explore the understanding and expectations held 
by Midshipmen and junior officers with respect to Operations Other Than War.  A 
second purpose is to examine whether understanding of, and expectations, about OOTW 
are related to officer retention in the military.   
The study focuses on four key areas: 1) OOTW understanding; 2) operational 
expectations; 3) operational experiences (junior officers only); and 4) the possible 
OOTW-retention relationship.  The research uses two surveys, one for midshipmen and 
one for the junior officers, with questions designed to provide amplifying information 
and insight concerning the four key areas. 
 The first key area, OOTW understanding, is explored by determining if the 
respondents are familiar with the past and current roles of the military in OOTW and the 
respondents’ sources of information.   Respondent expectations regarding war-fighting 
and OOTW are also explored by assessing the likelihood midshipmen and junior officers 
believe they will be personally involved in these operations.  Midshipmen expectations 
are further studied to determine if they may change during their time at USNA through a 
comparison of samples from First and Fourth Class members.  The third key area is 
investigated by determining the experience of junior officers with OOTW and/or war-
fighting.  Finally, the possible impact of OOTW on officer retention is explored by 
determining if involvement in these missions influences the decision of midshipmen and 
junior officers to join or stay in service.    
 
 48
B. THE SITE 
The U.S. Naval Academy was selected because it offers a unique environment to 
study the process of alignment between expectations and reality.  In one setting, the 
Academy has relatively new students with preconceived expectations of military service 
(midshipmen), as well as faculty and staff that have actually experienced the reality 
(junior officers).  The junior officers, through interaction with the midshipmen in this 
setting, play a major role in the development of future military officers.  By relating their 
recent experiences of military service to the midshipmen, they most directly affect the 
midshipmen’s expectations of what they may be called upon to do.  
 
C. THE PARTICIPANTS 
Both First (2001) and Fourth (2004) Class midshipmen were selected to explore 
the military socialization process at the Naval Academy and the alignment of 
midshipmen expectations of Naval Service with likely roles and missions in the “fleet.”  
A comparison of the two groups in terms of their expectations and understanding of 
OOTW should provide some perspective as to the impact of the Academy experience on 
their role expectations.  Essentially, the question is whether experiences at the Academy 
effectively align midshipmen expectations regarding OOTW with the realities of current 
military service. 
The Class of 2001 included a total of 930 midshipmen at the time of the survey.  
The total size of the Class of 2004 was 1,128 midshipmen.  After excluding international 
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students and midshipmen with prior enlisted military service14, the population size 
decreased to a total of 715 for the Class of 2001 and 844 for the Class of 2004. 
In an effort to minimize the number of midshipmen actually surveyed and the 
demands upon their time, the USNA administration limited the sample size to 20 percent 
for each of these two class year groups.  This resulted in a total possible sample size of 
152 for the Class of 2001and 185 for the Class of 2004.  Because participation was 
voluntary and the surveys were administered during the academic year (23 March – 13 
April 2001), the resulting response rate for the different classes produced actual sample 
sizes of 83 (7.4 percent of the class and 44.9 percent of the possible sample) for the Class 
of 2004 and 50 (5.4 percent of the class and 32.9 percent of the possible sample) for the 
Class of 2001.As previously noted, junior officers were selected for the survey to provide 
the perspective of officers who have actual operational experience, and, thus, a 
potentially more realistic view of OOTW.  This group essentially acts as the control 
against which the understanding and expectations of the midshipmen are compared with 
respect to OOTW.  Again, due to the voluntary nature of the survey, only a fraction of the 
total sample population of junior officers at the Naval Academy (346) was expected to 
reply.  The actual response rate for junior officers resulted in a sample size of 110, or 31 
percent of the total number of junior officers (O-3s and O-4s) stationed at the United 
States Naval Academy. 
                                                 
14 Some midshipmen enter the Naval Academy through enlisted ascension 
programs such as BOOST, NAPS, or direct admission.  Since they have already served in 
the military, their expectations have already been influenced and affected by the reality of 
military service.  Therefore, they were excluded from this study.  
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With respect to the junior officers sampled, over 60 percent claimed to have 
experienced OOTW during their career.  Among those junior officers claiming to have 
OOTW experience, 24 percent also claim to have been involved in war-fighting 
operations.  In contrast, among the junior officers without OOTW experience during their 
career, only 9 percent claim to have been involved in war-fighting. 
 
D. RESEARCHING OOTW 
A literature review was conducted with the intent of understanding OOTW and 
their role within the military.  A historical perspective was presented to convey the notion 
that these operations are not new, nor uncommon, to the U.S. military.  They have been a 
part of the military since its beginning and will likely play a major role in its future.  
Therefore, one should assume that new members to the military (midshipmen) should 
possess a certain level of understanding regarding OOTW and an expectation that they 
could potentially be involved in some of these operations.    
 
E. RESEARCHING THE EXPECTATION-REALITY RELATIONSHIP 
A literature review was also conducted to understand the possible significance 
and organizational effects associated with employee expectations and job realities.   
Specifically, the outcomes (i.e., turnover) resulting from employee expectation and job 
reality mismatches were of primary interest.  There is evidence in the research literature 
that unmet expectations result in lower job satisfaction, which increases the likelihood of 
eventual departure by employees from an organization.  Furthe r, the more closely 
expectations are aligned with actual career or work experiences, the less dissatisfaction 
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that will occur, resulting in a higher probability of retention.  Thus, the literature suggests 
the following hypothesis: the more a midshipman understands OOTW and the probability 
of personal involvement, the smaller the expectation-reality gap and related job 
dissatisfaction.  Conversely, the midshipmen would be more likely to stay in service 
beyond an initial obligation. 
It appears quite possible that the use of realistic job previews may lead to agreater 
sense of job satisfaction and organizational commitment, and subsequently lower 
turnover by closing the expectation-reality gap.  
 
F. SURVEY DESIGN 
Surveys were employed to gather information, opinion and sentiment from both 
the midshipmen and junior officers at the United States Naval Academy concerning their 
expectations of military service and understanding of Operations Other Than War.  The 
surveys were administered electronically through the USNA’s Institutional Research web 
page from 23 March through 13April 2001. (The surveys are presented in Appendix C.)  
Demographic data were acquired on junior officers through their survey.  Midshipmen 
demographic data were acquired by matching the alpha-number15 they provided on their 
survey with a master file held at the institution.  In both cases, only age and gender were 
considered relevant. 
                                                 
15  The alpha number is simply a five-digit number used for identifying all 
midshipmen at the USNA.  The number begins with the midshipmen’s graduation year 
and last four numbers of their social security number. (Example: A midshipman due to 
graduate in 2003 has an alpha number of 34567, where 4567 are the last four digits of 
his/her social security number.)  
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Many of the same questions were used for both surveys.  In some cases, minor 
modifications in format and syntax were required.  The questions are presented below 
and grouped by topic.  Each question is presented in italics, followed by a statement of 
rationale and an explanation of the question format. 
 
1. Understanding of OOTW 
 
Have any family members (parents, brothers, sisters) ever served in the U.S. 
armed forces?  
 
If the responses to this question were affirmative, it would be assumed that family 
members would have likely influenced the midshipman’s expectations and understanding 
of military service and missions.  Therefore, those answering in the affirmative are 
believed to have their expectations more aligned with the realities of service than those 
midshipmen answering in the negative.  
 
Were you familiar with the phrase “Operations Other Than War” prior to this 
survey? 
This question is intended to assess entry- level familiarity with the subject. 
 
Evaluate your understanding of the following missions in the context of U.S. 
military involvement:  
 
This question is designed to further explore the respondent’s personal 
understanding of missions commonly associated with OOTW, including drug 
interdiction, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, foreign internal defense, non-
combatant evacuations, and peacekeeping.  For each mission category, a five-point Likert 
scale is used with possible answers from 1 (not at all familiar) to 5 (extremely familiar). 
 
Please match the following operations/locations (1 through 6) with their 
corresponding mission by placing the number of the operation in the blank space 
preceding the mission. 
 
The intent of this question is to test the extent of the respondent’s familiarity with 
specific, recent OOTW missions, and to validate their self-assessed “familiarity” with 
OOTW, as offered in the previous question. 
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Who or what has been your greatest source of information regarding Operations 
Other Than War? (please select only one) 
The purpose of this question is to discover the major sources of influence 
affecting the expectations developed by the respondents with regard to OOTW.  The 
possible responses include: Family, Friends, Recruiters, USNA, or Other. 
 
2. Operational Expectations  
 
What do you believe is the likelihood of being personally involved in a traditional 
military conflict such as Desert Storm during your minimum service requirement? 
 
Desert Storm (1990-91) was the last major armed conflict with which the 
midshipmen would be most familiar.  Many of them would have been approximately 10 
years old at the time.  The responses possible are along a ten-division Likert scale from 
1=0 percent (I do not expect to be involved) to 11=100 percent (I fully expect to be 
involved). 
 
What do you believe is the likelihood of being personally involved in an 
“Operation Other Than War” during your first minimum service requirement? [JO form: 
during the remainder of your career?] 
 
This question is designed to allow for direct comparison with the answers given 
for the traditional conflict (Desert Storm) question.  Again, the responses possible are 
along a ten-division Likert scale from 1=0 percent (I do not expect to be involved) to 
11=100 percent (I fully expect to be involved). 
 
What do you believe is the likelihood of being personally involved in each of these 
non-traditional military operations during your first minimum service requirement? [JO 
form: during the remainder of your career?] 
 
This question explores the answer given to the previous question in greater detail. 
It is intended to further explore the respondent’s expectation of involvement with 
missions commonly associated with OOTW, including drug interdiction, humanitarian 
assistance, disaster relief, foreign internal defense, non-combatant evacuations, and 
peacekeeping.  The responses possible are along a ten-division Likert scale from 1=0 
percent (I do not expect to be involved) to 11=100 percent (I fully expect to be involved). 
 
What is your current likelihood of making the Navy a career (20-year service)? 
 
This question is intended to provide career orientation information on the 
respondents.  The possible responses are a ten-division Likert scale from 1=0 percent (I 




3. OOTW-Retention Relationship 
 
Indicate the relative impact of each of the following factors on your decision to 
join the military: Traditional missions, OOTW, Free Education, Career Training, 
Legacy, and Other. 
 
This question is meant to assess the factors contributing to the respondent’s 
decision to join the military, and, in particular, to determine if OOTW had any impact on 
that decision.  The individual factors are given a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (negative 
influence) to 5 (positive influence) for possible answers.   
 
If you indicated “other” as a factor impacting your decision to join the military, 
indicate below what that factor was. 
 
Self-explanatory: follow-up to the previous question.  
 
Now review the six factors listed below and rank order them from 1 (the largest 
influence on your decision) to 6 (the smallest influence). Use each number only once. 
 
The purpose of this question is to assess the relative importance of each factor 
(presented in the previous two questions) upon the respondent’s decision to join the 
military.  
 
Indicate the relative impact of each of the following factors on your decision to 
stay in the military [following your initial service requirement]: Traditional Missions, 
OOTW, Free Education, Career Training, Legacy, and Other. 
 
(Note: [ ] used only on midshipmen survey.) Similar to the former questions, but 
directed at the respondent’s decision to stay in the military, as opposed to joining.  
Respondents were asked to specify “other,” if selected, and then to rank order the factors 
from 1 (the largest influence on your decision) to 6 (the smallest influence).  
 
If you had been informed you were going to serve primarily in Operations Other 
Than War prior to entering the Naval Service, how would this have affected your desire 
to join the Naval Service? 
 
This question is designed to assess the respondent’s attitude toward OOTW, its 
importance with respect to military service, and to assess whether these missions would 
have changed the decision to join the military.  The possible answers are: Greatly 
Decrease, Decrease, No Effect, Increase, or Greatly Increase (desire to join).  Essentially, 
the intent of this question is to determine whether OOTW missions have either a positive 
or negative value in the recruitment process. 
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If you are called upon to serve primarily in Operations Other Than War, how 
would this affect your desire to stay in the Naval Service [beyond your initial 
commitment]? 
 
(Note: [ ] used only on midshipmen survey.) This question is designed to test the 
respondent’s attitude and expectations toward OOTW missions and whether these 
missions are more or less appealing to the service member as a retention factor.  Again, 
the possible answers are: Greatly Decrease, Decrease, No Effect, Increase, or Greatly 
Increase (desire to stay). 
 
Do you agree that the United States military should be actively involved in 
Operations Other Than War? 
 
This survey question is designed to determine respondent opinions regarding the 
appropriateness of OOTW missions for this nation.  A 5-point Likert scale is used with 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
 
4. Junior Officer Survey Form 
The following questions were used only on the survey of junior officers to assess 
their expectations and experiences regarding OOTW.  All questions described in the 
previous section were also asked on the junior officer survey.   
What is your military service community? 
 
The possible choices are surface, submarine, aviation, Marines, special warfare, 
staff, and other.  This question is the same as the one from the Midshipmen survey with 
the exception the word “desired” is removed prior to “service community.”  It is included 
to gather basic demographic data. 
 
How many more years do you plan to serve in the military? 
 
The choices are 1-3 years, 4-6 years, 7-9 years, 10-11 years, 12-15 years, and 
greater than 15 years.  Later questions address expectations with respect to OOTW and 
war during the respondent’s respective careers.  This question helps to refine the “during 
your career” period of time from previous questions.  
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Were you personally involved in a traditional military conflict such as Desert 
Storm during your career? (If so, explain.) 
This question is intended to uncover the possible experiences of the junior officers 
with armed military conflicts that may be characterized as war.   
 
Were you personally involved in an “Operation Other Than War” during your 
career? (If so, explain.) 
 
In contrast to the previous question, this focuses on the possible experiences of 
junior officers with OOTW.  
 
 
G. ANALYSIS OF DATA 
The data were collected at the completion of the allotted period for the survey.  
Midshipmen and junior officer data were collected and entered into separate Excel 
spreadsheets.  Variable names were given to the questions from both surveys.  Questions 
common to both surveys were given the same variable name and the two data sets were 
merged.  The merged data file was then imported into SPSS for further statistical 
analysis.  Descriptive statistics were then generated to examine within-group and 
between-group comparisons on several key measures.  
 
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 This chapter provides background information on the research site, subjects, 
method, survey design, and data analysis.  The Naval Academy offers a target population 
that allows for a comparison of the expectations held by future officers (midshipmen) 
with the initial expectations and actual experiences of current officers.  Survey questions 
were designed to investigate these expectations and experiences, and their association 
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with service member intentions to join or stay in the military.  The survey results are 
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V.  DATA ANALYSIS 
 
A. INTRODUCTION  
As previously noted, the primary goal of this thesis is to explore the 
understanding and expectations held by midshipmen and junior officers with respect to 
Operations Other Than War, and to examine the possible relationship between met/unmet 
expectations and officer retention in the military.  This chapter uses both independent and 
dependent sample means comparisons (ANOVAs and Chi-square t-tests) across the four 
key areas, as well as graphical representations (histograms) to achieve this goal.  As 
described in Chapter IV, the four key areas of study are: 1) OOTW understanding; 2) 
operational expectations; 3) operational experiences (junior officers only); and 4) the 
possible OOTW-retention relationship.  The four sample subgroups include the 
midshipmen classes of 2004 and 2001, as well as junior officers with OOTW experience 
and those without OOTW experience.  The results begin by presenting the demographic 
characteristics of the sample, followed by the analyses of survey questions corresponding 
to the four areas of the study cited above. 
 
B. BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE 
Figure 1 shows the specific warfare community to which the junior officers in the 
sample belong and the currently desired community of the midshipmen upon 
commissioning.  Over 60 percent of the junior officers sampled claimed to have 
experienced OOTW during their career.  Most junior officers with OOTW experience are 
in either the surface warfare (42 percent) or aviation (30 percent) communities.  These 
two communities are also the most desirable to the midshipmen: surface warfare  
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(26 percent of midshipmen respondents) and aviation (37 percent of midshipmen 
respondents).   The “other” communities designated by some respondents were medical 
corps, supply, fleet support, chaplain, and public affairs. 
 
Respondent Warfare Community 






















JO w/ OOTW exp.
JO without OOTW exp.
 
      Figure 1.  Midshipmen and Junior Officer Warfare Communities by Subgroup. 
Related Survey Question: “What is your (desired) military service community?” 
  
Figure 2 represents the likelihood of each subgroup to make the navy a career, 
defined as 20 years of service.  junior officers tended to either have a strong likelihood of 
staying in for a career or not, while the strongest concentration of midshipmen is mostly 
“on the fence” (50 percent likelihood) with regard to making the service a career.  This 
observation can be explained by the fact that midshipmen have yet to fully experience the 
navy and do not feel comfortable in making a determination is to whether the navy will 
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be a career.  Junior officers, however, have had the experience and have been able to 
make an informed determination whether to stay for 20 years or not.  Also, nearly 40 
percent of junior officers without OOTW experience expressed they had absolutely no 
desire to make the navy a career compared with 21 percent of those with OOTW 
experience.  At the same time, 34 percent of junior officers with OOTW experience 
expressed an absolute intent (100 percent likelihood) of making the navy a career, while 
junior officers without OOTW experience are noticeably less likely (23 percent) to make 
the same claim. 






















JO with OOTW exp.
JO without OOTW exp.
 
Figure 2.  Navy Career Likelihood by Respondent Subgroup. 
Related Survey Question: “What is your current likelihood of making the Navy a career (20-year 
service)?”  
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C. OPERATIONAL UNDERSTANDING 
As seen in Figure 3, generally, most respondents across the subgroups claimed to 
be familiar with the term “operations other than war.”  Junior officers without OOTW 
experience claimed to be least familiar with the phrase (26 percent), while nearly 90 
percent of respondents in each of the other subgroups indicated that they were familiar 
with OOTW. 
 












JO with OOTW exp.










Figure 3.  Respondent familiarity with the phrase “OOTW”. 
Related Survey Question: “Were you familiar with the phrase ‘Operations Other Than War’ prior  
to this survey?” 
 
In Table 1, with a mean rating of “3.0” representing the midpoint of the scale (i.e., 
moderately familiar), both junior officers (with ratings between 3.35 and 3.39) and 
midshipmen (with ratings between 3.18 and 3.50) believed, overall, they were reasonably 
familiar with OOTW across the various mission types.  Peacekeeping (3.72) and 
Humanitarian Assistance (3.53) were the OOTW missions with which respondents were 
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generally most familiar, while Foreign Internal Defense (2.83) and Non-combatant 
Evacuations (3.14) were the least familiar missions. Midshipmen from the class of 2001 
had the highest overall average (3.50), the class of 2004 had the lowest (3.18), and the 
junior officers fell in-between. 
Significant differences were noted between subgroups for the DI, HA, FID, and 
NEO missions.  We can reject the null hypothesis that the means are the same between 
the class of 2004 and the other groups on DI.  In fact, 2004’s understanding of DI (3.07) 
and NEO (2.73) is significantly lower than that of the other three groups.  The class of 
2004 was also significantly lower in its understanding of HA than was 2001, with 
averages of 3.34 and 3.72, respectively.  Further, the class of 2001 (3.12) was 
significantly higher than were junior officers without OOTW experience (2.88) in terms 
of their understanding of FID. 
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2.028 3.63 3.51 3.34 3.72 3.53 *c<d 
Disaster Relief 
(DR) 1.255 3.22 3.35 3.29 3.56 3.34 ns 
Foreign Internal 




**6.023 3.36 3.40 2.73 3.30 3.14 **c<a,b,d 
Peacekeeping 
(PK) 0.370 3.67 3.65 3.81 3.70 3.72 ns 
Totals na 3.35 3.39 3.18 3.50 3.33 na 
*   Indicated differences are significant at .05 level (comparing columns a through d). 
** Indicated differences are significant at .01 level (comparing columns a through d). 
Notes:  1. Related Survey Question: “Evaluate your understanding of the following missions in 
the context of U.S. military involvement:”  
2. Means are based on rating scale from 1=not at all familiar to 5=extremely familiar. 
3. ns = no significant difference. 
4. na = not applicable. 
 
Understanding of OOTW was also explored through the use of questions asking 
the respondent to match a given type of OOTW with a specific location and operation 
name.  Respondents correctly matching the type of operation to the correct place and 
name are believed to have a better understanding of the missions than those making an 
incorrect match.  Results are presented in Figures 4a through 4f and Table 2.  These 
results are based on the survey question:  
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Please match the following operations/locations (1 through 6) with their  
corresponding mission by placing the number of the operation in the blank space  
preceding the mission.  
1- Operation Restore Hope/ Somalia 
2- Operation Uphold Democracy/ Haiti 
3- Joint Task Force Six/ USA 
4- Operation Sea Angel/ Bangladesh 
5- Operation Joint Endeavor/ Bosnia 
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Figure 4a. Respondents Correctly Matching Drug Interdiction to Actual Operation 
by Subgroup. 
 
It is interesting to note here that despite both the class of 2001 and junior 
officerswith OOTW experience reporting approximately the same familiarity with the 
mission of drug interdiction (3.58 and 3.66 respectively), the percent correctly identifying 
this mission was only 62 percent among the class of 2001 compared with 96 percent for 
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Figure 4b.  Respondents Correctly Matching Humanitarian Assistance to Actual  
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Figure 4c.  Respondents Correctly Matching Disaster Relief to Actual Operation 
by Subgroup. 
 
All four respondent groups reported approximately the same familiarity with the 
disaster relief mission based on the results from Table 1, but only slightly more than half 
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of the midshipmen correctly identified the mission compared to 85 percent of the junior 
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Figure 4d.  Respondents Correctly Matching Foreign Internal Defense to Actual  
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Figure 4e.  Respondents Correctly Matching Non-Combatant Evacuation to  
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Overall, the majority of respondents correctly matched the OOTW missions of DI 
(78 percent of the respondents answered correctly), HA (74 percent), DR (69 percent), 
FID (61 percent), NEO (57 percent), and PK (68 percent). 
In Table 2, since the observed significance level is extremely small for DI, DR,  
and NEO, the null hypothesis that the subgroups gave the same responses to the question 
is rejected for these missions.  The results in both Figures 4a through 4f and Table 2 
suggest that junior officers, especially those with OOTW experience, exhibited a greater 
understanding of DI, DR, and NEO than did the midshipmen by correctly matching these 
missions to the operation name/location significantly more often.  As a whole, FID 
appeared to be the most difficult operation to identify across the four subgroups, while 
HA was the least difficult.  The class of 2001 was best in identifying HA and FID.  
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Otherwise, junior officers generally outscored midshipmen, particularly on DI, DR, and 
NEO. 
          Table 2.  Pearson Chi-Squared Test for Mission-Match by Respondent Subgroup. 
OOTW Missions  Chi2 value  
Drug Interdiction (DI) **23.803 
Humanitarian  Assistance (HA)      1.037 
Disaster Relief  (DR) **22.394 
Foreign Internal Defense (FID)      3.062 
Non-Combatant Evacuation (NEO) **22.500 
Peacekeeping (PK)      1.889 
*   Indicated differences are significant at .05 level. 
** Indicated differences are significant at .01 level. 
The primary source of information for midshipmen regarding OOTW was 
explored to determine the origin of their understanding of these missions.  Of the possible 
responses on the survey, friends and recruiters were not selected by any of the 
midshipmen.  As seen in Figure 5a, USNA was clearly the most often selected source of 
information (72 percent) on OOTW.  Also, USNA was the primary source of information 
for 75 percent of the class of 2001and 68 percent of the respondents from the class of 
2004 (Figure 5b.)  Among the other factors cited (24 percent for all midshipmen), the 
“news media” was the most common response16.  
                                                 
16 “News Media” was used to collectively account for responses specifying 
newspapers, magazines, and television news programs. 
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Figure 5a.  Primary Sources of Information about OOTW for Midshipmen. 
Related Survey Question: “Who or what has been your greatest source of information regarding  
Operations Other Than War? (please select only one)” 
 

















Figure 5b.  Primary Sources of Information about OOTW for Midshipmen. 
Related Survey Question: “Who or what has been your greatest source of information regarding  
Operations Other Than War? (please select only one)” 
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D. OPERATIONAL EXPECTATIONS 
As previously discussed, respondents were asked to indicate their expectations of 
personal involvement in fighting a war and OOTW in general, as well as personal 
involvement in various missions associated with OOTW. 
Table 3 presents the different respondent groups’ likelihood of involvement  in 
the different missions as a percentage.  The table illustrates the overall sample expressed 
higher expectations for becoming involved in OOTW (67 percent likelihood) than in 
fighting a war (39 percent likelihood).  The class of 2004 had the highest expectation for 
being involved in war-fighting (63 percent likelihood), while junior officers without 
OOTW experience had the lowest (19 percent likelihood).  The class of 2001 had the 
highest expectation for being involved in an OOTW (87 percent likelihood), and again, 
junior officers without OOTW experience had the lowest expectation (31 percent 
likelihood).  In general, midshipmen indicate a 25 to 44 percent higher expectation of 
personal involvement in an OOTW and war-fighting than junior officers. 
Several significant mean differences were also found between the subgroup’s 
expectations of involvement in specific types of OOTW missions.  Midshipmen have a 
higher expectation of being involved in fighting a war, as well as involvement in OOTW, 
than do junior officers, and junior officers with OOTW experience have a higher 
expectation than do their counterparts without such experience.  Midshipmen have a 
significantly higher expectation than do junior officers of performing all specific OOTW 
missions with the exception of DI.  And, junior officers with OOTW experience have 
significantly higher expectations of being involved in DR, FID, NEO, and PK than do 
those without such experience. 
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Table 3. Expectations (Percent Likelihood) of Participating in Specific Types of Missions 




























































*   Indicated differences are significant at .05 level (comparing columns a through d). 
** Indicated differences are significant at .01 level (comparing columns a through d). 
Notes: 1. Related Survey Questions:  
a. “What do believe is the likelihood of being personally involved in a traditional  
military conflict such as Desert Storm during the remainder of your career (first  
minimum service requirement)?” 
b.  “What do believe is the likelihood of being personally involved in an ‘Operation 
Other Than War’ during the remainder of your career (first minimum service 
requirement)?” 
c.  “What do you believe is the likelihood of being personally involved in 
each of these non-traditional military operations during the remainder 
of your career (first minimum service requirement)?” 
                                                 
17 Due to the rating scale beginning with 1=0%, the translation of the mean score 
to a percentage was appropriately adjusted (for example, a mean rating of 2.80 equates to 
an 18.0% perceived likelihood.) 
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E. POSSIBLE OOTW-RETENTION RELATIONSHIP 
 
Table 4 shows the influence of selected factors on the decisions of respondents to 
join the military.  It is based on a survey question that uses a 5-point Likert scale to gauge 
influence.  As seen in the table, there are no significant mean differences across the 
subgroups.  Nevertheless, some generalizations may be made.   
First, of the possible responses, education (4.40) and career training (4.36) had 
the most positive influence upon the decision of midshipmen to join the service, and 
legacy (3.33) had the least positive influence.  The other factors cited by the respondents 
included: a sense of patriotism or duty, leadership and travel opportunities, and the desire 
for a personal challenge. 
Table 4. Influence of Selected Factors (Mean Scores) upon Desire and Decision to Join 
the Military by Respondent Subgroup. 
Influence 















mission 0.090 na na 3.95 4.04 3.98 ns 
OOTW 0.148 na na 3.57 3.68 3.61 ns 
Education 0.629 na na 4.46 4.30 4.40 ns 
Career 
Training 1.381 na na 4.46 4.20 4.36 ns 
Legacy 0.003 na na 3.33 3.34 3.33 ns 
‘Other’ 
Factor 0.080 na na 3.94 3.85 3.90 ns 
*   Indicated differences are significant at .05 level (comparing columns a through d). 
** Indicated differences are significant at .01 level (comparing columns a through d). 
Notes: 1. Related Survey Questions:  “Indicate the relative impact of each of the following  
factors on your decision to join the military.” (Means are based on rating scale from  
1=negative influence to 5=positive influence.)  
2. ns = no significant difference. 
3. na = not applicable. 
 
Respondents (midshipmen only) were also asked to rank order the six factors 
from “1” (most important) to “6” (least important) with respect to their influence on the 
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decision to join the military.  The results were tabulated and appear in Table 5.  As seen 
here, the most influential factors in the decision of midshipmen to join the service were 
war-fighting and education (2.68), as well as career training (2.71).  The factors having 
the least effect upon their decision were legacy (4.71) and other (4.02).  An independent 
samples t-test revealed the differences between the Classes of 2004 and 2001 were 
significant for the ranks given to war-fighting and education.  Overall, midshipmen in the 
class of 2001 ranked war-fighting as the most influential factor while those in the class of  
2004  ranked education as the most influential factor.  For all other factors, the order of 
influence is equivalent for the two groups. 
Table 5. Factor Rankings (Mean Score) Regarding Decision to Join the Military 
(Midshipmen only). 






War-fighting mission 1.247 2.88 2.36 2.68 *c>d 
OOTW 0.060 3.76 3.66 3.72 ns 
Education 1.630 2.49 3.00 2.68 *c<d 
Career Training 1.008 2.57 2.96 2.71 ns 
Legacy 0.083 4.75 4.66 4.71 ns 
‘Other’ Factor 0.251 4.16 3.76 4.02 ns 
*   Indicated differences are significant at .05 level (comparing columns c and d). 
** Indicated differences are significant at .01 level (comparing columns c and d). 
Notes: 1. Related Survey Question: “Now review the six factors listed below and rank order 
them from 1 (the largest influence on your decision) to 6 (the smallest influence). Use 
each number only once.” 
2. Means are based on rating scale from 1=largest influence to 6=smallest influence. 
3. ns = no significant difference. 
 
The survey also asked midshipmen and junior officers to indicate the influence of 
selected factors (same factors previously examined for their affect on the decision to join  
the military) on their decision to remain in the military.  Again, the results are based on a 
survey question that uses a 5-point Likert scale to gauge influence.  Using this scale, a 
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mean score of 1 indicates a negative influence, a 5 indicates a positive influence, and a 3 
indicates no influence.   
As seen in Table 6, Career Training and War-fighting were selected as the most 
positive influences in respondent decisions to stay in the service, and OOTW and Legacy 
were the least influential  (although still positive) influences.  The other factors cited 
included: fun, job security, patriotism, challenge, duty, and possibility of family 
separation. 
Table 6. Influence of Selected Factors (Mean Scores) upon Desire and Decision to 



















mission 0.076 3.85 3.79 3.84 3.78 3.82 ns 
OOTW *3.253 3.19 3.28 3.64 3.62 3.45 **c>a 
*d>a 
Education **5.637 3.69 3.42 4.05 4.02 3.83 *c>a 
**c,d>b 
Career 




Legacy 0.727 3.34 3.19 3.18 3.16 3.22 ns 
‘Other’ Factor 2.014 3.24 3.03 3.48 3.72 3.37 ns 
*   Indicated differences are significant at .05 level (comparing columns a through d). 
** Indicated differences are significant at .01 level (comparing columns a through d). 
Notes: 1. Related Survey Questions:  “Indicate the relative impact of each of the following 
factors on your decision to stay in the military (following your initial service 
requirement).” (Means are based on rating scale from 1=negative influence to 5=positive 
influence.)  
2. ns = no significant difference. 
 
The results in Table 6 indicate that midshipmen found OOTW to be a significantly 
more positive factor than did junior officers with OOTW experience on the decision to 
stay in the military.  In addition, midshipmen generally found education and career 
training to be significantly more of a positive influence than did junior officers in their 
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decision to stay in the service.  The class of 2004 also found education and career 
training to be significantly more positive influences than did junior officers with OOTW 
experience.  All groups found warfighting missions as an equivalently positive factor in 
their decision to stay in the military. 
Respondents were also asked on the survey to rank the factors in terms of their 
relative influence on their individual decision to stay in the military with “1” representing 
the largest influence and “6” the smallest.  Table 7 shows the results of the respondents’ 
answers.  As seen here, in general, war-fighting (2.55) was cited as the factor having the 
largest influence in the “stay” decision process and legacy (4.81) was cited as the least 
influential factor.  Also, war-fighting, education, and career training were considered to 
be more influential than OOTW when deciding to stay in the service. 
Table 7.  Factor Rankings (Mean Score) Regarding Decision to Remain in the Military by 
Respondent Subgroup. 















War-fighting mission 1.412 2.69 2.72 2.57 2.18 2.55 ns 
OOTW 0.466 3.52 3.30 3.39 3.24 3.38 ns 




Career Training **4.934 3.49 2.79 2.67 3.00 2.99 
**c<a 
**a>b 
Legacy 2.003 4.54 5.07 4.88 4.86 4.81 ns 




*   Indicated differences are significant at .05 level (comparing columns a through d). 
** Indicated differences are significant at .01 level (comparing columns a through d). 
Notes: 1. Related Survey Question: “Now review the six factors listed below and rank order 
them from 1 (the largest influence on your decision) to 6 (the smallest influence). Use 
each number only once.” 
2. Means are based on rating scale from 1=largest influence to 6=smallest influence. 




Table 7 further indicates that significant differences exist between subgroups in 
the rank order given to the factors education, career training, and other.  Specifically, 
both midshipmen subgroups found education to be a larger influence in their decision 
than did junior officers with OOTW experience.  In terms of career training, the class of 
2004 thought it was more of an influence than did junior officers with OOTW 
experience, and junior officers with OOTW experience believed it was less of an 
influence than did junior offices without OOTW experience. 
 
F. GENERAL ATTITUDES 
The surveys asked midshipmen and junior officers the question: “Do you agree or 
disagree that the United States military should be actively involved in Operations Other 
Than War?”  As seen in Table 8, the average responses across the subgroups were 
between neutral and agree (with 1 for strongly disagree and 5 for strongly agree) in terms 
of U.S. involvement in OOTW.  A frequency distribution based on the response to the 
question (see Figure 9) shows the majority of respondents tended to either agree or 
strongly agree that the U.S. military should be actively involved in OOTW.   


















In OOTW 2.008 3.67 3.56 3.96 3.82 3.78 ns 
*   Indicated differences are significant at .05 level (comparing columns a through d). 
** Indicated differences are significant at .01 level (comparing columns a through d). 
Note: 1. Means are based on rating scale from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree. 
   2. ns = no significant difference. 
 
As seen below in Figure 6, 83 percent of midshipmen in the class of 2004 either 
agreed or strongly agreed that the U.S. military should be actively involved in OOTW.  
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This compares with 73 percent for the class of 2001 and junior officers with OOTW 
experience, and 65 percent for junior officers without OOTW experience. 
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Figure 6. Reaction to US Military Involvement in OOTW by Respondent 
Subgroup. 
Related Survey Question: “Do you agree or disagree that the United States military should be 
actively involved in Operations Other Than War?  
 
 
G. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
 Based upon the results of the survey, several conclusions to the initial 
research questions may be drawn.  A response to each research question (as stated in 
Chapter 1) is presented in order below. 
1) How do midshipmen understand the changing roles of the military in terms of OOTW?  
 
Since nearly 90 percent of the midshipmen respondents claimed to be familiar 
with the phrase “Operations Other Than War” and generally familiar to very familiar 
with various OOTW missions, it can be concluded that they understand the military has a 
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greater role than simply preparing to fight the nation’s wars.  However, there is also 
evidence that reported familiarity might be overstated, particularly for certain types of 
OOTW missions (see 3 below). 
2)  What do midshipmen believe the likelihood/possibility is of their personal involvement 
in these operations? 
 
The midshipmen believe the likelihood for personal involvement in future OOTW 
missions is extremely likely.  In fact, the class of 2001 believed there was an 87 percent 
likelihood that they would be personally involved in these missions and the Class of 2004 
believed the likelihood was close to 78 percent.  Midshipmen expectations are higher 
than those of junior officers with prior OOTW experience (62.5 percent likelihood) and 
considerably higher than those of junior officers without OOTW experience (30.5 percent 
likelihood).   
3) What is their current understanding of military roles/operations? 
 
Based upon the ability of the midshipmen to correctly match actual, recent 
OOTW operations with their specific location, it was determined that they have the least 
understanding of the missions involving non-combatant evacuation (Figure 4e) and 
disaster relief (Figure 4c).  Humanitarian assistance (Figure 4b) and peacekeeping (Figure 
4f) were the missions most understood by midshipmen, based on the survey results.  
However, these results also indicate that junior officers, especially those with OOTW 
experience, have a greater understanding of the OOTW missions involving drug 
interdiction, disaster relief, and non-combatant evacuations than do the midshipmen.  
Therefore, midshipmen still have a lesser degree of actual understanding of these 
missions when compared with junior officers. 
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4) Where does this current understanding (if any) originate? (Family, Friends,  
Recruiters, USNA?) 
 
An overwhelming majority (72 percent) of midshipmen claimed USNA was their 
primary source of information regarding OOTW, while 24 percent reported the media as 
their primary information source.  Between the classes, 68 percent of respondents from 
the class of 2004 cited the Academy as their primary source of information about OOTW, 
compared with 75 percent of respondents from the class of 2001.  Therefore, it appears 
USNA is providing information over the course of the midshipmen’s four-year stay to 
increase their understanding of OOTW missions and prepare them for the possibility of 
personal involvement in future OOTW missions.  
5)  What do midshipmen believe the likelihood/possibility is of their personal involvement 
in “traditional” military operations?  
 
Midshipmen felt there was approximately a 50-percent likelihood of being 
personally involved in military operations such as Desert Storm (2004= 52.7 percent, 
2001= 48.8 percent likelihood) during their first minimum service requirement.  In 
contrast, junior officers with OOTW experience believed there was only a 29.0 percent 
likelihood of personal involvement in a traditional military conflict during the remainder 
of their careers, and only an 18.8 percent likelihood was reported by junior officers 
without OOTW experience. 
6)  If they are aware of the military’s involvement in OOTW, do they expect to be 
personally involved during their initial service obligation? 
 
Midshipmen had the highest expectation of personal involvement in peacekeeping 
operations (69 percent likelihood) during their first minimum service requirement and the 
lowest expectation for being involved in drug interdiction operations (2004= 34.3 
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percent, 2001= 42.4 percent likelihood).  In general, junior officers also held the highest 
expectations of personal involvement in the OOTW mission of peacekeeping (JOs with 
OOTW experience = 44.3 percent, those without = 25.3 percent likelihood).  However, 
the expectations of junior officers are far lower than those of midshipmen. 
7)  Is participating in OOTW missions more/less appealing than participation in more 
 traditional military roles (i.e., preparing to fight a major two-theater war)? 
 
 The mean scores found in Tables 5 and 7 revealed that war-fighting (a traditional 
role) was ranked first out of six factors by both midshipmen and junior officers as having 
the largest influence.  OOTW was ranked fourth by midshipmen and junior officers.  
Also, Figure 2 shows that 40 percent of junior officers without OOTW experience 
expressed an absolute desire to leave service as compared with only 21 percent of junior 
officer’s with OOTW experience.  In contrast, 34 percent of junior officers with OOTW 
experience expressed an absolute desire to remain in service for a career (20 years), while 
only 23 percent of junior officers without OOTW experience have this career goal.  
Therefore, participation in OOTW missions appears to be less appealing to both 
midshipmen and junior officers than participation in “traditional” military roles. 
8) If midshipmen had the initial expectation that they would most likely serve primarily 
in OOTW missions, would this affect their decision to enter service? Would it affect their 
decision to stay? 
 
Based on the results from Tables 4 and 6, education and career training are the 
predominant reasons midshipmen join the military and feel will keep them in the military.  
War-fighting and OOTW were also positive influences on their decision to join and to 
stay in the military, but not as important to midshipmen as education and career training.  
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By contrast, junior officers felt war-fighting was the primary reason why they stay in the 
military followed by career training, education and OOTW. 
9)  Do their expectations change from the time they enter the Naval Academy as plebes 
to when they are about to graduate and begin their service? 
 
Based on Table 3, there were no significant differences between the classes of 
2001 and 2004 regarding their expectations for involvement in war-fighting, OOTW, or 
specific OOTW missions.  However, in terms of understanding, the class of 2001 
correctly matched (5 out of 6) OOTW missions to their respective operation name/ 
location more often than did the class of 2004, demonstrating a relatively better 
understanding of OOTW.  While their expectations may not change much over their four 
years at USNA regarding OOTW, it appears that their understanding does.  
 In general, it appears the midshipmen have much higher expectations for 
involvement in OOTW, but less understanding of the actual missions than do junior 
officers. 
 
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The results of the data analysis reveal that, in terms of operational understanding, 
all four subgroups on average self-reported that they were moderately familiar with the 
different missions associated with OOTW.  This self-assessment was supported by the 
percentages of respondents correctly matching OOTW missions with actual operations 
and locations.  Midshipmen familiarity was also found to be predominantly the result of 
information received at USNA, with the media being the second-most-often- cited source 
of information on OOTW. 
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As for expectations, the sample self-reported a likelihood of 67 percent for 
becoming involved in OOTW, in contrast to 39 percent for personal involvement in 
fighting a war.  Compared with junior officers, midshipmen expressed a 31 percent 
higher likelihood for involvement in OOTW and a 26 percent higher likelihood for 
personal involvement in a war.  At the same time, junior officers with prior OOTW 
experience expressed significantly higher expectations for future involvement in OOTW 
than did the junior officers with no previous OOTW experience. 
 Finally, the prospect of serving predominantly in OOTW appears to have little 
impact on the desire of midshipmen to join the military.  The most influential factors in 
their decision to join the military were the prospect of fighting in a war and educational 
benefits.  Educational benefits were also the most positive influence in the decision of 
midshipmen to join.  As for the decision to stay in the military, involvement in OOTW 
was one of the least influential factors.  War-fighting, educational benefits, and career 
training were all considered more influential than OOTW when deciding to stay in or 
leave the service.  In fact, war-fighting was the most influential factor in the decision to 
join the military and to remain in the military. 
In light of these results, the following chapter (Chapter VI) presents the 
conclusions drawn from the results of this research, provides some summary remarks, 
and offers recommendations for further research into the alignment of expectations with 
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VI.   SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 The survey results presented in the previous chapter have led to several 
observations and conclusions.  This chapter briefly summarizes the main points of the 
previous chapters, and focuses on the conclusions drawn from this research as a whole.  It 
also provides some recommendations and possible areas for further research on the 




The study is organized into six chapters.  Chapter I begins by providing some 
relevant background information, including definitions of commonly used terms and the 
basic research questions.    
Chapter II discusses Operations Other Than War in the U.S. military from a 
historical and contemporary perspective.  This chapter shows that the United States 
military has a long tradition of consistently and routinely performing roles and missions 
outside of solely fighting the nation’s wars.  These missions are not as “non-traditional” 
as many have labeled them, but, in fact, have and will continue to be a significant part of 
the nation’s national security policy.  Despite this history, and an increasing OPTEMPO 
in performing these missions, some evidence suggests that the personal expectations of 
many service members prior to, and shortly after, entry into the military centers on 
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training for and fighting big wars with clearly defined enemies.  Therefore, involvement 
in OOTW does not appear to be congruent with these expectations.   
Chapter III looks at the literature discussing the relationship between 
organizational turnover and employee expectations.  Specifically, it explores the role 
unmet expectations may play on an employee’s decision to stay or leave an employing 
organization.  A review of the literature leads to the conclusion that unmet expectations 
can result in personal frustrations and a loss of job satisfaction, eventually influencing the 
individual to leave the organization in hopes of finding a better employee-employer 
match.   This chapter also explores the use of Realistic Job Previews (RJPs) as a tool for 
better aligning individual job expectations with the actual realities of the job prior to 
organizational entry.  RJPs have been shown to be an effective tool in reducing possible 
organizational separation, or turnover.  
Chapter IV describes the methodology of this study, including the research-site, 
participants, and survey instruments used.  The United States Naval Academy (USNA) 
provided a single site with both new organizational members (Midshipmen), full of 
expectations about naval service, and experienced employees (Junior Officers), familiar 
with the actual realities of naval service and possessing their own expectations about the 
nature of future service in the Navy.  With respect to OOTW, both participant groups 
were given similar surveys to explore their expectations, their experiences (reality), and 
the possible association of these expectations and experiences with service member 
intentions to stay in or leave the military.   
In Chapter V, a descriptive analysis is presented of the data collected from the 
two surveys.  The results are organized based upon the topic areas of participant  
 
